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SOLVING PROBLEMS v. CLAIMING RIGHTS:
The Pragmatist Challenge to Legal Liberalism
William H. Simon*
Recent developments in both theory and practice have inspired a
new understanding of public interest lawyering. The theoretical
development is an intensified interest in Pragmatism. The practical
development is the emergence of a style of social reform that seeks to
institutionalize the Pragmatist vision of democratic governance as
learning and experimentation. This style is reflected in a variety of
innovative responses to social problems, including drug courts,
ecosystem management, and "new accountability" educational reform.
The new understanding represents a significant challenge to an
influential view of law among politically liberal lawyers over the past 50
years. That view – Legal Liberalism – is less a creature of academic
theory than an implicit popular jurisprudence of practicing lawyers. It
consists of a cluster of ideas associated with the Warren Court, the
ACLU, the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, Ralph Nader, and the legal aid
and public defender movements. This essay seeks to reconsider Legal
Liberalism in the light of the Pragmatist approach and to offer a
tentative appraisal of the newcomer. It begins by explicating the
sometimes-tacit premises of Legal Liberalism and exploring its
shortcomings. It then introduces the contrasting premises of the
Pragmatist approach as they appear in a variety of recent works of legal
scholarship. It illustrates the Pragmatist approach with a discussion of
two case studies – one of drug courts and one of "second generation"
employment discrimination remedies. It concludes with some comments
about ambiguities and limitations of Legal Pragmatism.
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D. The Reversion Danger
*

I. Introduction
The conventions of judicial and academic discourse encourage
legal writing to affect a position above politics. The writer appeals to
interpretations of authoritative texts and public values as if they were
shared across political perspectives. In fact, of course, both premises and
conclusions are hotly contested in most areas of legal discussion, and in
many, they correlate strongly with recognizable political positions. We
often think of the political distinction between conservatives and liberals
as a central axis of legal controversy.
In this Article, I propose to relax the conventions and focus
directly and explicitly on the liberal political perspective from which a
large fraction of the bar and an even larger fraction of the academy argue
in order to examine an interesting development within that perspective.
This is the emergence of a new liberal approach to legal issues in
substantial tension with, and sometimes openly hostile to, the best-known
older approach. The older approach can be called Legal Liberalism.
There is no canonical definition of Legal Liberalism, but we know it
when we see it. Its tacit indicia include predispositions in favor of
plaintiffs in tort and civil rights cases, defendants in criminal cases,
consumers in commercial cases, and workers in employment cases. Its
explicit elements include the positions and ideas conventionally
associated with the Warren Court, the ACLU, the NAACP Legal Defense
Fund, Ralph Nader, and the legal aid and public defender movements.
Until recently, criticism of these ideas has tended to come from
outside the more general political orientation with which Legal
Liberalism is associated. Legal liberals are liberals in the broader
political sense that connotes, first, a scheme of values that gives priority
to moderate versions of equality and liberty, and second, a position on
the American political spectrum between the middle and the far left.
Most criticism of Legal Liberalism has come from conservatives, who
tend to dispute the priority liberalism gives to liberty or equality, or from
radicals, who tend to dispute liberalism’s moderation.
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There have been occasional episodes in which a particular tenet
of Legal Liberalism has been challenged from within political liberalism.
Such disputes tend to generate a good deal of interest and tension. For
example, in 1976, Derrick Bell criticized the NAACP’s school
desegregation strategy as sacrificing the interests of urban blacks in
sounds education and political efficacy to an ineffectual and dogmatic
conception of rights. 1 More recently, a liberal critique has argued that
due process protections for criminal defendants associated with the
Warren Court unjustifiably impede minority communities from
organizing to protect vital interests in neighborhood security. 2
A more comprehensive critique in a spirit similar to these is
implicit in a growing body of legal studies invoking or reflecting the
tenets of Pragmatism. As philosophical doctrine, Pragmatism is noted
for its insistence that thought is instrumental (the truth or value of an
assertion lies, not in its correspondence with some ultimate reality, but in
what it can do for us) and contextual (assertions should be interpreted in
the social circumstances in which they arise). As political theory,
especially as elaborated by John Dewey, pragmatism is noted for its
commitment to and understanding of democracy as a process of
collaborative inquiry and learning. 3 Its theoretical commitments lead
Pragmatism to resist approaches to legal issues that rely primarily on
abstract analytical schemes and methods. Its institutional commitments
lead it to resist arrangements that are either centralized and
unaccountable on the one hand or anarchically diffuse on the other.
It is doubtful whether, in the abstract, any of these precepts poses
serious trouble for Legal Liberalism. But some recent writing has
pursued them, not in the abstract, but through studies of innovative
responses to social problems. The studies find the Pragmatist spirit in a
variety of experiments, including drug courts, ecosystem management,
"new accountability" educational reform, community policing,
international labor standards enforcement, employment discrimination
remediation regimes, and health disparity collaboratives, among many
1

Derrick A. Bell, Jr., “Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client
Interests in School Desegregation Litigation,” 85 Yale Law Journal 470 (1976).
2
E.g., Tracey Meares and Dan Kahan, Urgent Times: Policing and Rights in
Inner City Communities (1999).
3
See generally, Robert Westbrook, John Dewey and American Democracy 150194, 319-76 (1991); John Dewey, The Public and Its Problems 143-232 (1927).
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others. The studies have led to both particular conclusions and a general
programmatic approach that does challenge Legal Liberal premises. The
perspective of these studies is by no means the only possible legal
version of Pragmatism, but it is the most fully elaborated one. 4
In Part II, I offer a picture of Legal Liberalism, inferred from the
dominant tendencies of liberal lawyers’ rhetoric of the last 50 years.
Since I am interested in the implicit jurisprudence of practicing lawyers
more than in academic theory, I've relied as much on journalism and
casual observation as on scholarship. In Part III, I formulate some of the
principal objections to this doctrine from a variety of perspectives, more
4

My picture of Legal Pragmatism is based on the following works. Ian Ayres
and John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Regulation Debate
(1997); Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, The New Sovereignty:
Compliance With International Regulatory Agreements (1995); Michael Dorf and
Charles F. Sabel, “Drug Treatment Courts and Experimentalist Government,” 53
Vanderbilt Law Review 831 (2000); Michael C. Dorf and Charles F. Sabel, “A
Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism,” 98 Columbia Law Review 267 (1998);
Jody Freeman, "Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State," 45 UCLA Law
Review 1 (1997); Deepening Democracy (Archon Fung and Erik Olin Wright, ed.s
2003); Bradley C Karkkainen, “Information as Environmental Regulation: TRI and
Performance Benchmarking, Precursor to a New Paradigm?,” 89 Georgetown Law
Journal 257 (2001); James S. Liebman and Charles F. Sabel, “A Public Laboratory
Dewey Barely Imagined: The Emerging Model of School Governance and Legal
Reform,” NYU Journal of Law and Social Reform (forthcoming); Debra Livingston,
“Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places: Courts, Communities, and
the New Policing,” 97 Columbia Law Review 551 (1997); Dara O'Rourke,
"Outsourcing Regulation: Analyzing Non-Governmental Systems of Labor Standards
and Monitoring", Policy Studies Journal (2003); Joanne Scott and David Trubek, "Mind
the Gap: New Approaches to Governance in the European Union," 8 European Law
Journal 1 (2002); Susan Sturm, “Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A
Structural Approach,” 101 Columbia Law Review 458 (2001); Louise Trubek and
Maya Das, "Achieving Equality and Health: Health Care Governance in Transition,"
American Journal of Law & Medicine (forthcoming 2003); Robert Managabeira Unger,
Democracy Realized: The Progressive Alternative (1995).
A less specifically elaborated perspective with some kinship to these works is
Daniel Farber, "Reinventing Brandeis: Legal Pragmatism for the 21st Century," 1995
University of Illinois Law Review 163.
My apologies to authors included here who feel that my portrait of Legal
Pragmatism does not do justice to the distinctive virtues of their works, and to the
authors of many works omitted who might plausibly identify their efforts with it.
I have deliberately omitted those for whom the term pragmatism is simply a
synonym for utilitarianism, Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 151-53 (1986), or for
philistinism, Richard Posner, Law Pragmatism, and Democracy
(2003).
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or less pragmatist in spirit. Part IV elaborates the alternative perspective
of Legal Pragmatism, and Part V illustrates it with two of the Columbia
studies – one of drug courts by Michael Dorf and Charles Sabel and
another of sexual harassment litigation by Susan Sturm. In Part VI, I
consider some limitations of or objections to the pragmatist approach,
and its Columbia formulation in particula r.
I.

Legal Liberalism: An Exposition

Legal Liberalism consists of six mutually reinforcing premises.
Three are background premises – the Victim Perspective, Populism, and
the Priority of Rights. Three are practical and strategic; they involve
orientations toward the control of information; the choice of legal form
between rules and standards, and the structure of procedure. 5
A. Background Premises
1. The Victim Perspective. Legal liberalism sees law as
fundamentally concerned with the needs of the wounded and vulnerable.
It tends to conflate the realm of law with that of compassion. Among
traditional litigants, it is presumptively solicitous of tort plaintiffs and
criminal defendants. More recently, the presumption has been extended
to civil rights plaintiffs. And it has sought to extend legal protection to
successive new classes of wounded and vulnerable—abused women,
children, the elderly, the mentally ill, the disabled, mistreated worker and
tenants, and welfare recipients. 6
5

Legal Liberalism is a heuristic designed to capture the more prominent
tendencies in the discourse of liberal lawyers. Although I think Legal Liberalism is the
most influential perspective, I do not suggest it has been the only perspective among
liberal lawyers. And just as not all liberal lawyers accept this perspective, all those who
accept it are not liberals. Indeed, in my experience, politically radical lawyers, who
reject the broader political orientation of liberalism, usually think of lawyering in Legal
Liberal terms. There is no more reliable expounder of Legal Liberalism than The Guild
Practitioner, the journal of the National Lawyers’ Guild. Radical lawyers have never
developed a distinctive conception of practice.
6
The victim perspective is most often an unstated assumption, but there is a
substantial literature arguing for it explicitly. E.g., see Mari Matsuda, “Looking to the
Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations,” 22 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil
Liberties Law Review 323 (1987); for an overview of the literature, see Devon W.
Carbado, "Race to the Bottom," 49 UCLA Law Review 1283 (2002).
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The Victim Perspective does not exactly repudiate the traditional
premise that law must do justice even when justice is in tension with
compassion. But its solicitude for the weak and injured plays a strong
background role. It motivates the expansion of law into new domains.
And it operates as a presumption in cases of ambiguity or uncertainty.
For example, there is uncertainty about social facts, such as whether the
death penalty deters crime or welfare causes family break-up or
unemployment. The victim perspective resolves such doubts in favor of
defendants and recipients generally. Then there are adjudicative facts—
the facts of particular disputes, such as whether Clarence Thomas
harassed Anita Hill in the manner she alleged. The victim perspective
resolves such doubts in favor of the more vulnerable contestant. Finally,
the victim perspective tends to privilege the interpretive constructs that
vulnerable people apply to the world over those more commonly adopted
by the less vulnerable. If, for example, women experience sexual
harassment as part of an organized structure of systemic disadvantage at
work, while their employers understand it as a series of isolated, aberrant
misfortunes, the former fact alone supports adopting the systemic view.
The Victim Perspective is so engrained in the discourse of liberal
lawyers that we may forget that it is a recent innovation, even within
liberalism. In the liberalism of the 18th and 19th century, legal rights
were associated most basically with the bourgeois property owner. The
19th century labor movement was ambivalent as to whether its members’
interests would be served by conceiving and protecting them as legal
rights. 7 But however it came out on this issue, the labor movement’s
core projects of organization and bargaining were not designed to protect
the most vulnerable members of society, at least not directly; these
projects were designed mainly for able-bodied working-age adults (and
more often than not only white, male, and skilled ones). Often, the
movement anticipated many indirect and long-term benefits to others
from its projects, but it also recognized that these projects imposed shortterm costs on some of the most vulnerable people. (For example, the
exclusionary work and immigration practices it favored deprived some
of employment for the benefit of better-off workers.) The idea that
rights have a distinctive affinity with extreme vulnerability is entirely
foreign to this perspective. The Progressives of the late 19th and early
7

See William Forbath, Law and the Shaping of the American Labor Movement

(1991).
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20th centuries did focus on the protection of vulnerable groups such as
the unemployed, women, children, the elderly, and mentally ill. But as
recent liberals complain insistently, the Progressives tended not to
formulate their projects in terms of legal rights, as Legal Liberalism
understands them. 8
2. Populism. The second predisposition of Legal Liberalism is a
deep distrust of large institutions, especially governments and big
business corporations. This distrust generates extreme sensitivity to the
corruptions of power and wealth. The stereotypes of the government
official and the corporate executive portray the primary motivation of the
former as power- lust and that of the latter as greed.
"Today it is the combined power of the government and the
corporations that weighs upon the individual," Charles Reich wrote in
the seminal academic contribution to Legal Liberalism. 9 The closing
arguments and after-dinner speeches of tort plaintiff’s lawyers routinely
contrast the virtues and vulnerabilities of “the people” or “the little man”
with the rapacities of corporations or the state. 10 The philosopher David
Luban, a leading theorist of legal ethics, asserts that “the real value of
advocacy is the protection against institutions that pose chronic threats to
well-being,” a category in which he includes all government and big
business institutions. 11
The political doctrine that emphasizes the pervasive corruption of
institutions is populism. Populism juxtaposes to the corruption of
institutions the virtue of unorganized individuals, and it portrays the role
of the political leaders as largely defensive and redistributive, checking
the excesses of organized elites in order to provide benefits for
8

See, e.g., Anthony Platt, The Child Savers: The Invention of Delinquency

(1977).
9

Charles Reich, "The New Property", 73 Yale Law Journal 733, 773 (1964).

10

E.g.:
[W]hen a warrior for the people demonstrates he can sometimes beat the
king’s favorites, the corporate giant, the money makers, that he can free the
accused once safely in the clutches of the king [i.e., the state] – such a warrior
stands for the proposition that the little men can win and little warriors for the
people can survive in the courtroom….”
Gerry Spence, Gunning for Justice 386 (1982).
11
David Luban, “Partisanship, Betrayal, and Autonomy in the Lawyer-Client
Relationship,” 90 Columbia Law Review 1004, 1128 (1990); see also id. at 1019.
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unorganized citizens. There is some analogy to the role of unorganized
citizens and political leaders in the Populist political vision in the role of
trial lawyers, perhaps judges, and above all, juries, in Legal Liberalism.
Trial lawyers, judges, and juries have in common their relative
independence from the constraints, and presumably corruptions, of large
institutions. In particular, the jury — as a temporary assembly of
ordinary individuals, only minimally accountable to surrounding
institutions — incarnates the Populist anti- institutional ideal.
3. The Priority of Rights. We also find in legal liberalism a
commitment to formulating certain fundamental norms as rights and to
insisting on the priority of these norms over other values. Rights are
analytical, individualistic, categorical, judicially enforceable, and
corrective.
Rights are derived analytically by the application of legal
reasoning to authoritative sources. They are ultimately grounded in
social consensus, but the derivation of specific conclusions in contested
cases requires specialized methods and institutions. Thus, courts and
lawyers play a predominant role, and the most important part of that role
consists in a mode of reasoning that generates specific conclusions of
entitlement.
Rights are individualistic; they protect autonomy. They have in
general the quality that Reich ascribed specifically to property:
Property draws a circle around the activities of each
individual or organization. Within that circle the individual has a
greater degree of freedom than without. Outside he must justify
or explain his activities and show his authority. Within he is
master, and the state must explain or justify any interference.
There must be sanctuaries of enclaves where no majorities can
reach. 12
There is no consensus within Legal Liberalism on the exact
content of the category of rights. But the rights idea has an affinity with
individual interests in privacy and physical autonomy, with claims

12

Reich, cited in note , at 787.
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against state interference with individual action, and with the protection
of established entitlements. 13
The idea of “enc laves where no majorities can reach” also
connotes the categorical quality of rights. Rights differ from other norms
in being less susceptible to trade-offs and balancing. For some, rights
are “trumps” that compel recognition and conclude discussion. 14 For
others, rights have a vaguer priority; they yield only to exceptionally
weighty non-rights values. In any case, to designate something is a right
is to imply that has presumptive priority over some competing set of
values.
Further, a right strongly implies, if it does not entail, judicial
definition and enforcement. The remission of rights enforcement to even
a relatively benign administrative structure — say, the Veterans’
Administration in its dealings with veterans — is deeply suspect. Even
more so is their remission to private institutions — for example, through
the easy enforcement of contractual arbitration clauses. The central
judicial role implies an exemption from the general Populist suspicion of
institutions for judges as well as juries. Legal liberalism is rife with
idealized portrayals of the judicial role and sentimental homages to
particular judges. (The role of the judicial clerkship as a paternalistic
initiation ritual for elite academics contributes to this tendency.) In a
less romantic vein, the judiciary is simply the “least dangerous branch”;
the one whose institutional constraints limit its capacity for corruption
and dispose it to rights enforcement.
Finally, rights with monetary remedies are typically grounded in
corrective justice – the rectification of past wrongs at the expense of
those deemed responsible for them. Legal Liberalism tends to presume
that injurious wrongdoing ought to give rise to claims for redress against
the wrongdoer. We see this in the attachment to the tort system as
opposed to no- fault compensation systems. We see it as well in the
position that currently disadvantaged people whose position is due to
injustice they or their ancestors suffered under prior legal regimes
13

In “The New Property”, Reich used several images suggesting the physical
autonomy interpretation, such as the New York case that denied welfare benefits to a
man who insisted, against the instructions of welfare officers, on sleeping under a
bridge. Id. at 758. When he came to formulate his conception of right explicitly,
however, he emphasized protection for vested economic benefits. Id. at 785-86.
14
Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 184-205 (1977).
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receive "reparations" from surviving corporate and governmental
institutions that bear responsibility. 15
“Rights talk” has come in for a good deal of criticism lately, but
one indication of its continued vitality is the emergence of international
human rights litigation in the American trial courts. The international
human rights movement is explicitly committed to a Victim Perspective,
in this case, the victims of some of the most extreme cruelty and injustice
on the part of governments. Until recently, however, human rights
activism was thought of as a humanitarian activity. Lately, activists have
pushed with notable success for its juridification.
One of the most interesting (though perhaps not most important)
developments has been the opening of the American courts, with the
encouragement of Congress, to lawsuits asserting individual claims
against foreign states and their officials for human rights abuses abroad.
There are now damage actions pending in the American courts against
the Chinese premier Li Peng for injuries sustained at the Tiannamin
Square massacre and against President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe for
violence against political opponents, among others. 16
Such suits represent a substantial departure from the traditional
institutional approach to such claims. Traditionally, if we put aside the
remote possibility of redress in the courts of the countries where the
wrongs occurred, such claims were deemed matters of diplomacy,
negotiations by one sovereign with another, or more recently, by
international organizations like the United Nations. If American citizens
or even residents were victims, the State Department might seek redress
on their behalf. Otherwise, the interests of victims would likely be
remitted to international organizations.
In part, the move for
juridification reflects disappointment with the records of these past
efforts and, in particular, a Populist- like distrust of non-court institutions.
The move to litigation also reflects an assertion of the priority of the
liberal conception of rights in this area. An important part of what the
activists rejected in the diplomatic approach was the idea that the
interests of victims could be asserted as part of a large menu of interests
in which they could be traded off for other interests. For the State
15

Robert Worth, "Companies Are Sued for Slave Reparations," New York
Times (March 27, 2002), sec. B.
16
William Glaberson, “U.S. Court Become Arbiters of Global Rights and
Wrongs,” New York Times (June 24, 2001), sec. A., p. 1, col. 3.
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Department, such litigation is objectionable because such awards, if
seriously enforced, would limit the discretion of American diplomats in
sovereign-to-sovereign negotiations. The diplomats might have to trade
off some other interests in order to induce compliance with the judicial
decree or in order to placate an offended foreign state. But for human
rights activists, the claims of victims should not be susceptible to tradeoffs or balancing of this sort. 17
B. Operating Premises
1. Procedural individuation and differentiation. The first basic
practical premise of legal liberalism is that disputed facts on which a
claim of right depends be determined in a distinctive manner. This
manner is the adjudicatory hearing. Ideally, such a hearing involves
personal appearance by the claimant, representation by a lawyer, oral
evidence and cross-examination, and a law-trained professional decision17

There is a key exception to the Legal Liberal attitude toward rights -- the labor
law of collective bargaining. The labor law that came down from the New Deal is
distinctive in the extent to which it restricts conventional individual rights in the
interests of collective power. For example, it permits non-union members to be bound
by union actions without their consent, and it deprives workers of individual
enforcement rights with respect to many key interests, remitting them to rights within
the union. The idea is that effective joint action requires a limitation of individual
autonomy.
For decades, liberals generally supported this regime as a halfacknowledged exception to their commitment to individual rights. The rights-based
critiques of labor law tended to come from conservatives. (The phrase “right to work”,
meaning the right to be hired without having to pay dues to a union, has definite
reactionary connotations.) The civil rights movement partially discredited the New
Deal regime because of the unions’ pervasive mistreatment of minority and women
workers under that regime. It was easy to win liberal support for rights of minority and
women workers to bring challenges to union discrimination directly to the courts. But
outside of race and gender issues, full-scale liberal challenges to the collectivist
premises of the New Deal regime were rare. Perhaps the clearest one – Staughton
Lynd, “Government Without Rights: The Labor Law Vision of Archibald Cox,” 4
Industrial Relations Law Journal 483 (1981) -- did not appear until 1981.
However, labor law and unions have ceased to play the central role they once
did in the liberal thought. In law schools, this means that virtually the only course in
which the individualist premises of the liberal commitment to rights are systematically
put in question from a left perspective is one that most students, even most politicallyengaged left students, don’t take. (I say “virtually” because there is another exception –
the law of Native American tribal relations – but that course has always been marginal.)

13

maker with substantial independence from both market and bureaucratic
pressures. 18
This relatively elaborate and expensive procedure is valued in
part as the most effective means of enforcing claims of right. Rights
enforcement is important in itself and because it has some deterrent
effect that induces potential defendants to comply with legal
requirements in their general course of conduct. However, the liberal
commitment to adjudication is founded on more than accurate
decisionmaking and deterrence. Adjudicatory participation has an
intrinsic value. The opportunity to have one’s “day in court” (or in a
diluted administrative variation) is asserted to be an important
satisfaction, even to those who are unsuccessful on the merits.
Adjudication serves “dignitary” values. It expresses respect for the
claimant.
Adjudication in this view is an individual procedure. The dignity
in question is that of an individual participating alone or through a
representative committed only to her in a proceeding concerning a right
peculiar to her. At least, this is the paradigm. The forms of collective
adjudication—aggregate settlements, consolidated trials, class actions—
are innovations whose contours are substantially undefined and whose
legitimacy is contested precisely because they depart from individual
claim determination. To the extent that they permit conclusive
determination of rights without opportunities for direct participation by
claimants and without claimant control of lawyers, they generate a good
deal of anxiety within Legal Liberalism.
A further feature of this perspective is that adjudication is
strongly differentiated from administration. Dispute resolution processes
have little resemblance to routine decisionmaking processes and are
structurally separate from them. Adjudicatory processes are more
elaborate and more individual. Routine decision- making is summary and
wholesale. Legal regulation focuses largely on the dispute processes,
and is relatively uninterested in routine decisionmaking until routine
decisions become disputes.

18

Goldberg v. Kelley, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967);
Jerry Mashaw, "The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus in Mathews v. Eldredge:
Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value," 44 University of Chicago Law Review
28 (1976).
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The separation of administration and adjudication is reinforced
by the adjudicatory ideal of the decisionmaker. The adjudicator is
supposed to be someone not involved in the original decision and not
subject to supervision by anyone who is. Ideally, he is to have
substantial independence from those who enact the norms that she is
applying. And she is to have legal training, which will differentiate her
background from those making administrative decisions. Thus, the
paradigmatic adjudicatory institutions — the courts -- enjoy unique
organizational autonomy. But even in the broad range of administrative
adjudications that within public and private bureaucracies, the
adjudicatory processes are typically strongly separated from the
administrative ones. 19
2. Rules and Standards. A pervasive dialectic of modern legal
thought arises from the opposition of rules and standards. 20 A rule is a
norm that strictly limits the range of factors that the decisionmaker can
consider; it characteristically dictates a particular decision upon a finding
of one or a few basic facts. A standard mandates that the decisionmaker
vindicate a more general value by considering the full range of relevant
facts in the context in which the dispute arises. “Do not drive over 65
miles per hour” is a rule; “do not drive unsafely” is a standard. Rules
have an over- and under- inclusive quality. They sometimes require the
decision- maker to decide in a way that is inconsistent with the ultimate
purposes of the rule. Standards have an indeterminate quality. Since
they enlarge the range of relevance, they tend to make for more
expensive enforcement procedures, and there is often controversy about
how they should be applied even to undisputed facts.
The dialectic of rules and standards is not unique to Legal
Liberalism, but it has an especially strong resonance there. On the one
hand, there is both a moral and a social cost to the under- and overinclusiveness of rules. Under-inclusiveness means that there is no
sanction for socially obnoxious conduct or no assistance for sociallyrecognized need that does not come within the terms of the rule. Over19

See Philippe Nonet, Administrative Justice: Advocacy and Change in a
Government Agency 125-243 (1969) (chronicling the growth of procedural
individuation and differentiation – "judicialism" and "administrative withdrawal" – in a
worker's compensation program).
20
See Duncan Kennedy, “Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication,” 89
Harvard Law Review 1685 (1975).

15

inclusiveness means that we penalize otherwise acceptable or desirable
conduct or reward undeserving conduct just because it does come within
the terms of the rule. Such results potentially involve a sacrifice of
social welfare, justice, and soldarity. This intuition led the Warren Court
to flirt with the “irrebutable presumption” doctrine. The court rejected a
Food Stamp rule that denied eligibility to a household when any member
had been declared as a dependent on the tax return of a non- member.
The court viewed the rule as presuming irrebutably and unreasonably,
first, that the putative dependent was being supported by the taxpayer
and, second, that the remaining household members were being
supported by him. It then went on to suggest that the Constitution might
invalidate any such regulatory over-breadth to the extent that it deprived
a poor person of a basic need. But on reflection, the court backed off. 21
The consequences of such a doctrine would have been too drastic. The
legal system depends pervasively on rules. It requires them in order to
reduce decisionmaking costs and to restrain the discretion of people we
cannot trust to make complex judgments.
The response to this dilemma in Legal Liberalism consists of
three tendencies.
First, there is a preference for standards for
decisionmakers who are presumed trustworthy; a preference for rules for
decisionmakers who are presumed not trustworthy. The most salient
trusted class is the judiciary. In general, lega l liberalism has favored
broad contextual decisionmaking power for judges under norms like due
process, reasonableness, public convenience and necessity, and just
cause. The most salient distrusted class is the police. Thus, we have the
Miranda rule for them.
Second, rules are acceptable and even desirable when the costs of
under- or over-inclusion are borne by non-disadvantaged people. The
costs of the exclusionary rule in criminal cases are borne by the
prosecution, rather than the class of criminal defendants favored by
Legal Liberalism. The costs of strict liability in tort, a rule-like norm,
are borne by defendant corporations, rather than the favored class of
plaintiffs. A rule- like welfare system of child allowances or a negative
income tax is preferred to a standards- like means-tested one on the
21
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assumption that the costs of over- inclusion of the former are borne by the
state.
Third, where the law gives institutions power over ordinary
people, standards should be deployed to allow the latter to raise the full
range of pertinent social values that weigh against the adverse exercise
of such power in the circumstances of the particular case. This means
broad defenses of fraud, duress, mistake, and unconscionability in
contract. It means just cause standards for job dismissal and eviction. It
means tort recovery for pain and suffering and emotional distress, as well
as material loss.
3. Confidentiality and Bilateral Information Control. Liberal
legal practice is characterized by strong confidentiality safeguards and an
emphasis on the role of lawyers in the strategic control of information.
The most salient norms here are the strong attorney-client
evidentiary privilege, the ethical duty of confidentiality, and the civil
procedure norm that requires the disclosure of disadvantageous material
information only when the opposing party is able to formulate a demand
for it. The bar's confidentiality rule is an extreme one that requires the
lawyer to withhold information in a broad range of situations where
disclosure might remedy substantial injustice. The Civil Procedure rules
sometimes deny important information merely because the opposing
party is unable to formulate an adequate demand for it, most likely,
because she lacks sufficient awareness of the nature of the information. 22
More broadly, this approach gives the lawyer the role, once the
possibility of dispute has arisen, of gatekeeper between client and the
outside world. At least presumptively, the client is supposed to cease
direct or unilateral communications with outsiders. In discovery and
often in regulatory compliance, the lawyer takes charge of disclosure
functions. The attorney-client privilege encourages firms to put lawyers
in charge of investigations of possibly illegal conduct in order to
minimize the possibility of involuntary disclosure of the findings.
Parties and even nonparty witnesses are accompanied to depositions by
lawyers, who tell them that they must not volunteer information.
Lawyers instruct and rehearse clients extensively for trial. Once the very
22
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prospect of litigation arises, the client is instructed not to communicate
about the matter even in contexts unrelated to the litigation. Injury
victims, prospective tort and criminal defendants, and even witnesses
routinely tell journalists that their lawyers have told them not to talk
about the case, and this is usually accepted as a satisfactory explanation
for their silence.
We have grown accustomed to the sight of witnesses at
Congressional hearings, even those who have little prospect of being
joined in related litigation, appearing with and intermittently consulting
lawyers. No one thought it at all remarkable, for example, that Anita
Hill, herself a lawyer, appeared for her testimony in the Clarence
Thomas confirmation hearing with a battery of lawyers, even though
there was little prospect of ensuing litigation and her role, in theory, was
just to give a straightforward lay account of events she had observed.
The gatekeeper function is supposed to play a role in protecting
various privacy rights of the client. The most important of these is the
privilege against self- incrimination. This rationale, however, has limited
relevance. In many situations, there are no relevant privacy rights (aside
from those that attach to the attorney-client relation itself). In these
situations, the lawyer’s information-control function is explained as
serving social interests in accurate disclosure. We get more disclosure
because clients, assured of their lawyers’ loyalty, make more disclosure
to their lawyers, and the lawyers persuade and assist clients to pass on
the information to the extent the law requires this. (Whether the
persuasion involves appeal to self- interest or to public duty is left
ambiguous.) Moreover, we get more concise and accurate disclosure to
the extent that the lawyer is able to shape it to remove redundancy and
ambiguity. 23
The idea of lawyer control of information is related to a litigation
procedure dominated by a trial format characterized by orality,
continuity, and concentration. Unlike procedure in civil law countries,
the paradigmatic Anglo-American trial is a single, continuous event,
rather than a series of discrete evidentiary proceedings. It typically takes
place in a short period of time and nearly always occupies only a small
fraction of the course of the entire litigation. It emphasizes oral
testimony by witnesses present in court.
23
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Of course, a trial is a rare thing in American litigation; most cases
are settled. But a trial of this kind is the default procedure in the absence
of settlement, and the prospect of trial is an overwhelming influence on
settlement. Legal liberalism celebrates this kind of trial as a powerful
safeguard of justice.
The Anglo-American trial reinforces the role of the lawyer as
gatekeeper. A proceeding of this sort puts a high premium on extensive
preparation and precise execution. A litigant has a single, intensely
focused opportunity to make her case. Mistakes or bad impressions are
relatively hard to correct. Because the trier has a limited opportunity to
absorb the case, clarity and coherence of presentation are critical. The
tradition of the adversary system mandates relative passivity on the part
of the judge and constrains her ability to assist the litigants directly in
presenting their cases. Under these circumstances, the dominance of
professional advocates is inevitable. 24
Moreover, this procedure encourages lawyer control prior to the
trial. The compression of the trial means that a single piece of evidence
can have a large impact. Nuance is often lost, and sophisticated
explanations are not always possible. The Anglo-American trial is in
some respects a battle of sound-bites. The procedure thus creates the
risk that a prior statement, when offered in evidence, out-of-context and
shorn of nuance, will create a misleadingly adverse impression at trial
that was not anticipated at the time it was made. The impression may be
hard to correct, and it may require the expenditure of scarce time and
effort to do so. This kind of risk justifies the lawyer in advising the
client to forego independent communication about the circumstances in
issue.
Notice that partisan control at trial and partisan witness
preparation reinforce each other. Partisan witness preparation leads to
distrust of witnesses, which leads to giving opposing counsel great
latitude in cross-examination. But anticipation of the distorting effects
of hostile cross-examination intensifies the need for witness preparation.

II. A Liberal Critique of Legal Liberalism
24
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Legal Liberalism remains the dominant perspective of a broad
segment of the bar, but there is less confidence and more unease about it
than there once was. There are familiar critiques of it. One critique
objects that a program that focuses on rights without devoting
proportionate attention to corresponding duties undermines the moral
and institutional basis for productive social cooperation. 25
Rights
consciousness diverts attention from the kinds of altruistic effort and
self-restraint that society has a right to expect from even its
disadvantaged members. Although this point may seem smug when
voiced from a position of upper class privilege, it has been voiced
increasingly in recent years from among the disadvantaged themselves.
If criminal defendants tend to be disadvantaged, so do the victims of
crime, we are reminded. Some leaders of poor communities have
expressed sympathy for the idea that an emphasis on rights to, for
example, welfare may impede the developme nt of initiative and selfdiscipline needed to attain economic self-sufficiency. 26
Another critique asserts that the recognition and even
enforcement of legal rights for the disadvantaged is unlikely to
significantly improve their well-being in the absence of reforms
fundamentally altering the distribution of wealth and power. Such an
upheaval is not part of the legal liberal agenda, and its tools of rightscreation and enforcement would be inadequate to it. But in the absence
of fundamental redistributive change, the effects of liberal rights
expansion will be swamped by economic and political inequality.
Sellers of goods or services will respond to consumer protection
doctrines by raising their prices or ceasing to deal with poor consumers.
Employers will respond to restraints on arbitrary or discriminatory
discharges by hiring less. Middle class whites will respond to
desegregation decrees by moving to the suburbs. Government agencies
will respond to conditions on their administration of programs by
shutting the programs down or by shifting resources from areas where
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they have discretion in order to comply with judicial commands in other
areas. 27
There have been persuasive replies to both types of critique from
within Legal Liberalism, 28 but both rema in important and, on some
points, powerful. Here I want to consider some criticisms in a somewhat
different spirit. These criticisms are more grounded in the basic
commitments of political liberalism. They do not assert the futility of
redistributive reform, and while they do invoke notions of duty and
responsibility, they do not do so in the name of hierarchy or conformity,
but in the interest of effective democratic collective action on the part of
the disadvantaged.
A. The Anti-Policy Bias of Rights Talk 29
It is difficult to criticize the rights theme in Legal Liberalism.
For one thing, the notion of right has undeniable value as an expression
of core values of individuality. For another, its meaning and effect are
elusive. The indeterminacy of the rights idea means that it has the
capacity to embrace almost any appealing normative consideration.
27
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Nevertheless, as conventionally used, right does not connote
simply any important value. It works rhetorically to privilege a subset of
values and to bias consideration of competing ones, in particular, against
collective as opposed to individual values, against values that require
public assistance as opposed to non- interference, against new as opposed
to established benefits, and against consequences other than immediate
benefit to the claimant. Thus, it is harder to make a rights claim for a
neighborhood's opportunity to control land development within its
borders than against a taking of an individual's property without
compensation. It is harder to make a rights claim for police protection
from private harassment than for freedom from police harassment. It is
harder to make a rights claim for the provision of as-yet unenacted
welfare benefits than against rescission of enacted Social Security
benefits. To be sure, there is a tendency to try to expand the rights claim
to embrace any interest deemed important by political liberalism. 30 But
this course would dilute the rights idea to triviality. The central
rhetorical thrust of the rights theme has always been to suggest that there
is a sub-category of important interests that merit a special type of
commitment from the legal system.
In operation, however, rights rhetoric does not seem to mark out
a set of claims that could plausibly be regarded as more central to the
basic liberal commitments of liberty and equality than the claims against
which this rhetoric is invoked. To be sure, the rhetoric resonates with
the long tradition of constitutionalist political theory that holds that
certain protectio ns of individual flourishing must be safeguarded against
legislative majorities. To some extent then, rights talk implicates the
debate within political liberalism between constitutionalism and
legislative supremacy. 31 But often this rhetoric is deployed in a stale,
dogmatic manner that reflects little more than a desire to protect
longstanding visceral attachments against re-examination.
This impression is magnified by a series of intellectual rigidities
that commonly accompany the rights theme. These include the
following:
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-- a formalist tendency to assume that legal texts have timeless
and essential meanings that can be derived without reference to their
contexts;
-- a “slippery slope” tendency to assume that the smallest
reduction of an entitlement will cascade into an enormous loss,
-- a Utopian tendency to ignore the costs of the recognition of
entitlements;
-- a paranoid tendency to portray competing values in terms of
the interests of government and corporate power and wealth;
-- a sentimental tendency to defend general rules with broad
social consequences in terms of dramatic, emotionally compelling, but
not necessarily typical, stories of individual misfortune, and
-- a self-righteous tendency to see serious injuries as
consequences of morally blameworthy misconduct.
Of course, these tendencies are not unique to Legal Liberalism.
The claim here is simply that, within Legal Liberalism, they are strongly
associated with the rights theme. Practitioners who wished to alleviate
their pernicious influence would do well to be more circumspect about
their deployment of rights rhetoric.
The only way to support this claim is through examples. Here
are two:
1. Community Policing. In an article called “When Rights Are
Wrong,” Tracey Meares and Dan Kahan criticized Warren Court
criminal procedure doctrine for impeding efforts by minority
communities to organize to enhance neighborhood security. 32 They
focused in particular on the “void- for-vagueness” doctrine used to strike
down loitering ordinances and search-and-seizure doctrine. These
doctrines were being used by the American Civil Liberties Union and
other opponents against a series of measures adopted in some of the most
crime-troubled minority neighborhoods in Chicago. One such measure
was the “mass building search” for weapons or drugs in housing projects.
Another was a loitering ordinance that gave police discretion to order
people suspected of gang-related activity to disperse.
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Against the ACLU interpretation of the Warren Court precedents
that such measures should be categorically invalid, Meares and Kahan
argued that their validity should be assessed contextually in terms of
three factors. The first factor is the extent of support for the measures in
the local communities affected by the m. Measures imposed by a remote
and unrepresentative government ought to be suspect, but measures
supported by local institutions deserved deference. Second, “burden
sharing” – whether the costs of the measure unfairly accrued to some
recognizable group within the community (other than groups defined
primarily in terms a propensity for illegal activity). If the burdens were
fairly distributed, then that should weigh in favor of acceptance. Third,
“guided discretion” – the extent to which the measures are accompanied
by processes that structure the discretion they confer and induce
accountability for its exercise. Meares and Kahan pointed out in
connection with the Chicago loitering ordinances that the police
department permitted its enforcement only by designated officers
working under specific guidelines and that enforcement was part of a
“community policing” strategy in which police worked closely with
neighborhood groups.
As they surely anticipated, the responses to Meares and Kahan’s
argument, all from card-carrying liberals, were largely and sometimes
passionately negative. Some of the responses challenged the suggestion
that their three criteria were satisfied in the Chicago case. In particular,
they questioned whether there was broad and informed support in the
affected minority communities for the measures and whether the police
were exercising their discretion in a structured, accountable fashion. But
several respondents challenged the criteria themselves and insisted that
the measures in question should be invalid regardless of whether the
three conditions were satisfied.
For example, Albert Alschuler and Stephen Schulhofer argued
that the idea of an affected “community” was so indeterminate that it
could not be properly defined for the purpose of measuring approval (a
skepticism that would seem to preclude democratic legitimacy for any
legislative act) and that “Our Constitution does not permit a majority to
limit individual rights simply by offering to share the burden” (ignoring
Meares and Kahan’s point that the likelihood of disproportionate burden
should determine whether there is a constitutional right). The “Framers”,
they conclude, “enacted a Constitution that guaranteed rights, not to
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collectivities, but to individuals,” (failing to note that the Framers would
almost certainly have considered anti- loitering laws legitimate). 33
Alschuler and Schulhofer at least implied that a unanimous
waiver might be acceptable (though given their skepticism about
legislative boundaries, it would have to be a global one). Carol Steiker
would not go even this far. For her, the rights established by these 40
year-old Warren Court cases are timeless and inalienable. She framed
the issue as a contest between “indispensable freedoms” (not to be
subject to police discretion) and “expedient policy” (the interest in not
being victimized by violent crime) and insisted that the former must
“trump” the latter. 34
The themes of these critiques – extreme skepticism about
democracy and all forms of nonjudicial collective action, the selective
invocation of tradition, the conclusory privileging of interests
conventionally defined as individual – are echoed in Alan Dershowitz’s
contribution. Dershowitiz takes particular exception to Meares and
Kahan’s effort to promote the interest in neighborhood security to the
level of a right by the term “group rights,” dismissing the term as an
“oxymoron,” noting ominously that “groups have interests and agendas”.
“Our traditional conception of rights,” he further insists, “is directed
against governmental abuses.” Interests that don’t fit within this
conception just have to yield because of a “fundamental lesson of
history, that in the long run, abuses by the state are far more dangerous to
liberty and democracy than individual criminal conduct.”35 Presumably
this “fundamental lesson” does not mean we should have no state
enforcement of the criminal law, but Dershowitz never explains why it
dictates a scope that excludes the Chicago measures. Meares and Kahan
had not ignored the danger of state abuse; they’d simply proposed
different checks – community and departmental monitoring. But
apparently for Dershowitz “history” speaks only through the Warren
Court.
33
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Alschuler and Shulhofer, Steiker, and Dershowitz all invoke the
“slippery slope” trope to suggest that, even if these Chicago communities
had somehow plausibly and legitimately concluded that it was in their
interests to adopt the measures, they should not be permitted to do so
because their actions would have bad precedential effects elsewhere.
The premise seems to be that other communities would be unable to
discern the particular features that distinguished Chicago’s situation from
their own and thus be tempted to import the Chicago innovations to
inappropriate environments. The critics don’t explain why they think
this difficulty with contextual thinking is so widespread. The suspicion
arises that they are simply projecting the pathologies of their own
rhetorical practices on the population at large.
2. Tort Reform. The American tort system has radical
deficiencies that one would expect liberals to decry. The system
provides no benefits at all to most injured people because, for example,
they were injured without fault (or without discovering the fault), or their
damages are too low to warrant the cost of bringing a claim, or the
injurer is judgment-proof. The awards the system does make are
staggeringly arbitrary, depending on the actual or anticipated judgments
in thousands of dispersed venues of panels of lay decisionmakers
assembled for a single case, operating under vague instructions, and
without any knowledge of decisions in other cases. (These are exactly
the conditions that liberal lawyers often mention as making fair
decisionmaking about the death penalt y impossible.) The system’s effect
in deterring bad conduct seems weak, and in some respects, perverse.
Most importantly, the compensation it does provide is accomplished only
at huge expense. Less than fifty percent of the total payments by
defendants go to claimants, in some categories, much less. For example,
in one series of studies, “close to two-thirds of insurance company
expenditures in asbestos suits (including cases settled before trial) ended
up in the pockets of lawyers and experts for both sides rather than in
those of asbestos victims and their families.”36
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You might expect liberals to favor the replacement of this system
with one that is more inclusive, involves stronger administrative and less
partisan control, and restricts or eliminates juries, such as that proposed
by Stephen Sugarman or the one actually operating in New Zealand.
To some extent, they do, but many liberal lawyers seem to have a soft
spot for the tort system. Their indulgence seems related to the fact that
comprehensive reform challenges the basic commitments of Legal
Liberalism to procedural individuation and partisan control, its populist
suspicion of nonjudicial state actors, and a tendency to regard the
benefits that the current system provides as rights.
Surely these premises play some role in the virtual disappearance
of comprehensive tort reform from Liberal Legal discussion and political
practice in recent years. Instead, both debate and practice have focused
around a small set of incremental reforms, most proposed by
conservatives or businesses, such as caps on non-economic damages or
limits on attorneys’ fees. Such ideas address important problems in the
system, but most are poorly designed. 37 Thus, there are ample grounds
for opposing them. Nevertheless, much of the Liberal Lawyers’
discussion of them is striking for its absence of serious analysis or
meaningful alternatives.
Much of it, including virtually all the
statements of Ralph Nader and the trial lawyers’ associations, expresses
a vehement categorical opposition to any serious alteration of the system.
Rhetorically, this rigidity is strongly associated with rights talk.
Currently, doctors in several American states say there is a
malpractice crisis. At least one insurance company has gone under, and
several have cancelled coverage of especially risky practice areas, such
as obstetrics. Rates have soared to the point that some doctors are
abandoning their practices. (Even before the crisis malpractice insurance
rates in the United States were 10 times the rates in Canada.) The
doctors are asking state legislatures to intervene. Asked for his views on
this situation, the president of the West Virginia trial lawyers’
My assertions about the tort system rely on Kagan’s excellent analysis of the
literature at 127-144; Stephen Sugarman, Doing Away With Tort Law: New
Compensation Mechanisms for Victims, Consumers, and Business (1989); and
Michelle Mello and Troyen Brennan, "Deterrence of Medical Errors: Theory and
Evidence for Medical Malpractice Reform," 80 Texas Law Review 1595 (2002).
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association said, “The real crisis we face is the threat to our system of
justice. They want to take away our fundamental right to seek and obtain
compensation for a wrong.”38
The idea that the pay-offs flowing from the lottery that our tort
system has become represent “fundamental rights” has been taken to
heart by several state Supreme Courts, who have struck down various
reforms. The Supreme Court of Florida, for example, interpreted a
provision of the state constitution providing no more than that “the
courts shall be open to every person for redress of any injury” to
effectively constitutionalize established tort law. It followed that a
$450,000 cap on pain-and-suffering damages was invalid regardless of
the policy justifications for it: “[W]e are dealing with a constitutional
right that may not be restricted just because the legislature deems it
reasonable to do so.”39 Courts in at least 18 states have held a variety of
tort reforms to deny several constitutional rights, including rights to due
process, equal protection, and jury trial. 40 The decisions have in
common that they are based on formalistic deductions from vague
constitutional language, they more or less explicitly refuse to consider
policy arguments, and they afford a level of protection to tort plaintiff’s
rights considerably greater than the same courts typically give to private
law interests.
Dogmatic conceptions of right played an important role in the
1998 defeat of a Congressional response to health claims against the
tobacco companies that would have replaced expensive lawyerdominated litigation with administrative tribunals and streamlined
eligibility criteria and procedures. The proposed settlement would have
also strengthened federal regulation over cigarettes and, at once,
increased resources and re-directed them away from individual claim
payment toward pub lic health measures. After elaborate negotiations,
38
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the proposal was killed by coalitions of self- interested trial lawyers and
sincere activists under the influence of Legal Liberalism. In a detailed
account of the negotiations, Michael Pertshcuk concludes that the
opposition was mistaken and reports that some of the opponents,
including Ralph Nader, are having second thoughts. 41 No doubt the
merits of the settlement were debatable, but it's troubling that so much of
the argument against it took the form of unreflective rights rhetoric.
Opponents denounced the bill's (quite modest) limitation of damage
liability as a violation of individual rights, even though no one could say
reliably what the magnitude of civil liability under existing law was or
which claimants could expect to benefit.42 They insisted on the
importance of punishing the companies with massive liability, even
though there was little reason to believe such liability would have any
effect on the individual wrongdoers (who were likely to have retired or
sold their stock) or on the practices of the companies (which would
continue to operate after bankruptcy, now peddling their wares for the
benefit of the plaintiffs). 43
Rights rhetoric on tort reform is strongly reinforced by Populist
themes. There is considerable public sympathy for injured people, and
the typical voter is more likely to find herself in the position of a tort
plaintiff than of a tort defendant. In simple majoritarian terms, one
would expect legislatures to fairly protect pla intiffs' interests. It is thus
41
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an important part of the case against judicial deference to legislatures
that they have been captured by corporate interests. Thus, Ralph Nader
in a book with Wesley Smith calls tort reform “The Corporate Scheme to
Wreck Our Justice System.” After dismissing reform proposals as “a
direct assault on victims” and “anti- individual rights,” they describe at
length the corporate contributors to various groups lobbying and
advocating for changes and conclude, “Behind the various front groups
agitating for tort deform [sic] in Washington and state capitals are the
usual suspects: America’s richest industrial and insurance companies and
their power- lawyer lieutenants from [the] big firms….”44 Nader and
Smith do have some policy arguments against the reforms, but their main
point seems to be that they are discredited simply by virtue of their
association with the presumptively greedy striving of big business.
They take no account that one of the major lobbying and
advocacy forces on these issues is the plaintiff’s bar. You would never
know from them that the vanguard of this bar has emerged in recent
decades as a wealthy and highly organized political power. Nader and
Smith include an appendix listing “The Top-Grossing Law Firms in the
United States” and their annual gross revenues, 45 apparently intending to
awe and disturb us with the large numbers, but do not mention that most
of the highest-paid individual lawyers in the United States are tort
plaintiff’s lawyers. 46 The contributions of the trial lawyers to President
Clinton’s first electoral campaign were among the largest of any industry
group, and when Clinton vetoed two liability reform bills in his first
term, the vetoes were widely attributed to their influence. 47
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B. The Inhibition of Civic Organization
The Priority of Rights and the commitments to confidentiality
and procedural individuation suggest a view of law as the vindication of
a series of discrete individual entitlements. This view does not rule out
lawyering in connection with civic organization, but it sometimes turns
out to be in significant tension with it.
1. Social Policy Design. The rights idea also has a bias in favor
of certain styles of social policy that may impede civic organization.
Rights can impede organization by providing a substitute for it. The
decline of American unions, for example, has been accompanied by the
growth of a panoply of worker protections in the form of individual
rights (for example, unlawful discharge constraints, anti-discrimination,
ERISA, health care regulation). There is no necessary causal relation
between individual rights and union decline, but there is a potential one.
When society channels benefits through unions, it raises individual
incentives to join and thus helps unions overcome the “free rider”
problem that leads many not to join even though they benefit from the
union’s activity. For this reason, some nations provide a role for unions
in the administration of social insurance or training benefits. Giving
unions responsibilities for general benefit programs generates economies
of scope with other activities and brings them into routine contact with
workers. Conversely, a state that makes many benefits available as
individual rights may inhibit the union’s organizing abilities. If the
workers still need the union for some purposes but find it more difficult
to organize, they could be worse off. 48 Moreover, effective union action
may depend on the union's ability to compel dissidents to comply with
majority decisions and police free-riding by people who get the benefits
of collective action but are disinclined to contribute to them. Strong
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individual rights – for example, to refuse to abide by strike decisions or
to contribute to union political activity – can impair collective efficacy. 49
Just now in American housing and welfare policy there is a
recurring competition between “mobility” policies, such as vouchers that
create portable benefits that the individual recipient can take with her,
and policies that provide benefits to community-based organizations to
make improvements rooted in particular communities. One of the
arguments for the latter is that they are more likely to induce civic
participation that creates social capital that provides variety of collective
benefits. 50 I cannot say that liberal lawyers have been hostile to the
second approach, but their ideological premises make it difficult for
them to explain its potential virtues.
2. Professional Responsibility and Legal Aid. If the idea of right
implies a discrete entitlement that an individual holds “against the
world”, the corresponding idea of the lawyer-client relation is a
"community of two" in which a professional champion protects the client
from outsiders. 51
This image, as expressed in the professional
responsibility norms derived from the premises of confidentiality and
procedural individuation, sometimes creates tensions with efforts to
connect lawyering with civic organization. The tensions are reinforced
when this lawyering image is combined with the Victim Perspective.
We can see this in the recurring anxiety about organizing and
organizations in the movement to provide civil legal aid to the poor.
Lawyers' primary professional commitments are to clients. They
may not make commitments to principles or collectivities that conflict
with the interests of clients (other than the positive law and certain basic
procedural norms). They may not take on clients when their own
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commitments are likely to limit their pursuit of the client's interests. 52
They may not put themselves in positions where third parties can
influence their actions on behalf of clients. 53
The degree of constraint these principles impose depends on how
they are interpreted. There was a time when they were interpreted to
preclude lawyer participation in most efforts to combine organizing with
individual claim assertion. Traditionally, where lawyers acquired
overlapping responsibilities to both individual clients and organizations,
the bar was quick to find ethics violations on the basis of even
speculative conflicts of interest. The two most important examples are
the NAACP’s antidiscrimination campaign and the railroad unions'
efforts to assist trainmen in asserting workers’ compensation claims.
Lawyers who took individua l cases referred to them by the NAACP and
the unions as part of these organizations' broader political strategies were
disciplined on the ground that they had put themselves in a position that
might require them to sacrifice client interests to those of the
organizations. In neither case was there any evidence that the clients
were not well- served, and in both cases the campaigns against the
lawyers were promoted by the clients' adversaries. In both cases, the
campaigns to stop lawyers from cooperating with these organizations
were halted only by Supreme Court cases holding that the activities were
protected by the First Amendment. 54
The bar’s efforts in these episodes are today considered
transparently reactionary, and Legal Liberalism does not identify with
them. But the anxiety they reflect about the conflict between client and
organizational commitments still has an influence. The idea of the
lawyer-client relation as a fortress for a single desperate individual seems
to have played an important role in the reluctance of legal aid programs
to organize small-case, neighborhood practices strategically. Gary
Bellow, among others, argued for decades that they should do this. 55
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The resources available for such work are sufficient to serve only a small
fraction of the claims that might be asserted on behalf of the poor. In
addition, many of the legal problems presented in these individual cases
have a systemic quality; they involve practices of large institutions that
affect broad numbers of people. It thus makes sense for legal services
programs to set priorities and focus their efforts on these systemic
problems. Bellow also suggested that aggregating and coordinating
individual cases might be superior to appellate litigation for addressing
many systemic problems. Appellate litigation is slow, and appellate
rulings often have limited impact because there are insufficient resources
to enforce them. Individual case work can take place at the grassroots
level and may be more amenable to coordination with other forms of
civic activism.
Some legal services offices take a strategic approach to service
work, but more resist it. They tend to set very broad parameters and then
take whatever cases within them people happen to bring into the office.
Some of the pressure to practice this way comes from conservatives with
influence in Washington, who are suspicious of any federally subsidized
lawyering that looks political. But few legal services lawyers are
themselves conservatives, and they have their own reasons for inclining
toward a non-strategic style of service practice. They are uncomfortable
turning clients away. Under any model, they will turn some people
away, but under a focused, strategic model they will turn away more
people and sooner. Moreover, they are uncomfortable setting priorities.
Emotionally, they see their cases as discrete representations of individual
people. Cognitively, they think of the job as the enforcement of
individual rights.
These inhibitions can be mitigated by making an organization a
client. Under the bar's norms, an organizational client is treated more or
less like an individual. And if the organization is committed to
principles the lawyer regards as valid, the potential for tension between
collective commitments and client loyalty is minimized. There are at
least two limitations to this approach, however,
First, some legal aid lawyers put such a strong value on
representing individuals that they are reluctant to accept any
organizational representation that might put them in opposition to a poor
person. For example, lawyers in a legal services program I’m familiar
with once opposed representing a community nonprofit developing
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subsidized housing because representing the corporation might preclude
them, under conflict-of-interest norms, from representing tenants in the
housing after it was built, for example, if the corporation sought to evict
the tenants. The corporation was a highly- regarded community-based
organization. No one knew any reason to think it would mistreat its
tenants. But these lawyers would have rather foregone the opportunity to
represent an admired organization than lose the speculative possibility of
representing individuals against it.
Second, disadvantaged groups are less formally organized than
others. This means that if the legal aid lawyer wants to represent
organizations, she will sometimes have to help form them. Efforts to
help people organize will involve the lawyer in jointly representing
individuals. While such representation is common, the bar's norms
express discomfort with it. They mandate a hypersensitivity to conflict
that can sometimes inhibit or preclude particular efforts to assist groups
that are not formally organized.
The norms on joint representation caution against the danger that
jointly represented individuals will disclose confidences to each other
and then regret it. Or that one of the individuals may end up getting less
in a joint representation than if she were separately represented. Under
the previously dominant rules, lawyer could not undertake a joint
representation unless it was “obvious” that the representation would
work out well for everyone, a standard that if taken literally, would
almost never be satisfied. 56 Even under the newer, more liberal standard,
it is not enough that the representation appears to be the best course for
everyone. If there is serious uncertainty, doubts are to be resolved
against joint representation. 57
If disputes develop, the lawyer may have to cease representation
of any of the individuals. More than likely, she won’t be permitted to
remain with the majority, or with those whose positions she believes are
most consistent with the original project. The concern is that she will
have confidences from each of them that she should not be permitted to
use to his or her disadvantage. Even without confidences, the doctrine
sometimes suggests that a sense of continuing loyalty to each individual
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precludes continued representation adverse to a former jointly
represented client. 58
To some extent, this solicitude for the individual client is not
waivable, at least prospectively. Suppose ten tenants ask a lawyer to
bring a lawsuit against their landlord for failure to maintain the premises.
They think that by conducting their cases in concert, they will achieve
both cost efficiencies and greater leverage against the landlord. They
also think that the landlord will not be willing to settle with any of them
unless he can settle all the cases. They thus agree that they will abide by
majority rule with respect to strategy and settlement. If one of them
defects from the agreement, may the lawyer follow enforce the
agreement by following the instructions of the majority with respect to
all the cases? If not, may he at least continue to represent the majority?
Although the answers have lately become unclear, the traditional answer
is no. 59 Loyalty to individual clients precludes the lawyer from
vindicating this kind of collective commitment. But such loyalty
deprives such individuals of opportunities for effective collective action.
C. Minimizing Lawyer Accountability to Clients
At the same time that it exalts the individual client and seeks to
protect her from outside forces, Legal Liberalism leaves the client
vulnerable to the lawyer.
The principles of confidentiality and
individuation reinforce this vulnerability.
Organized clients generally have the resources and sophistication
to hold their lawyers accountable for their performance. But the
individual client of whom Legal Liberalism is most solicitous does not.
There is substantial indication that lawyers for individual clients
commonly exploit them by overcharging or providing negligent or
knowingly poor service. 60 The reason is not that they are more or less
greedy than others, but that the mechanisms of accountability are so
weak.
The professional responsibility norms that inhibit the lawyer from
establishing relations with both individuals and organizations they are
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affiliated with preclude or constrain some of the more plausible
monitoring relations. Unions and insurance companies are sometimes in
a good position to monitor the quality of service given to their members
or insureds, but the bar has successfully resisted such efforts on the
ground that they would jeopardize confidentiality and independence of
judgment on behalf of the client. Aside from enjoining confidentiality of
client information, the bar's norms forbid allowing a third party who pays
for legal services or refers the client to "interfere" or "direct" the lawyer's
conduct. 61 Although such norms preclude opportunistic interference,
they also preclude benign interference designed to insure quality of
service. 62
For decades the organized bar sought to prohibit group legal
service or legal insurance plans in which lay people had any executive
role or which limited beneficiary choice to a "closed panel" of lawyers
who had a continuing relation with the group or insurer (and hence
would be subject to at least indirect monitoring). 63 The ABA takes the
position that, while boards of legal aid programs may review the work of
staff lawyers, they may regulate decisions in ongoing cases only through
general policies, not through ad hoc review. 64 Legal aid lawyers often
resist any qualitative evaluation of their work on the ground that it would
interfere with their independent judgment on behalf of the client.
Plaintiffs’ lawyers commonly insist that the medical profession is
unaccountable, aside from the malpractice system, for medical
mistakes. 65 But the non- litigatio n monitoring of much of medical
practice is quite rich compared to the monitoring of most of the practice
of plaintiffs' lawyers. American hospitals at least have peer review
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procedures that do not depend on patient complaints. There is no
comparable monitoring procedure for lawyers. The disciplinary agencies
of the medical licensing authorities may be lax, but surely no more than
the comparable agencies of the bar. The recent Harvard study of medical
mistakes, based on a review of randomly chosen treatment files at
hospitals, would be inconceivable with respect to tort law practice. 66 No
one could get access to enough files.
The class action for damages represents another highly
unaccountable representative structure. Here the only plaintiffs likely to
have direct contact with the lawyer commonly have no significant
individual stake, and hence, incentive to monitor. Courts are supposed to
watch out for the class, but they have limited information and have often
shown remarkable disinclination to do so. 67
Consider also that the Legal Liberal’s inclination to turn
dependent people, especially children and the mentally disabled, into
rights holders has created more non-accountable representative
structures. The old paternalistic practices of juvenile courts and mental
health institutions functioned poorly, but they were potentially more
transparent and, to that extent, accountable. The lawyer’s insistence on
the independence and confidentiality of his relation with client makes
accountability difficult. In the famous Pennhurst case challenging a
Pennsylvania institution for the retarded, the plaintiff’s lawyer initially
undertook to represent the mother of the named plaintiff, as guardian of
her daughter. When the mother objected to his efforts to close, rather
than improve, the institution, he indicated that he would take instruction
only from the daughter (who by then was an adult but whose ability to
make the relevant decisions was doubtful). 68
Finally, the Liberal Legal idea of rights as something to be
argued and derived analytically may encourage lawyers to limit client
participation. When Derrick Bell questioned whether the NAACP’s
school desegregation strategy was responsive to the views of members of
the client classes, NAACP’s General Counsel Nathaniel Jones replied:
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The responsibility I, as chief litigation officer of the
NAACP have, is to insure that each plan the NAACP submits to
a court … must square with the legal standards pronounced by
the Supreme Court as necessary to effectively vind icate
constitutional rights, and bring into being a unitary system. 69
D. Diseconomies of Information
Observers find the American judicial system vastly more
expensive than those of the nations to which we usually compare
ourselves. Some concede that it has the advantage of accommodating
certain large-scale challenges to corporate and government abuse that
could not be brought in other systems. But at the same time, large-scale
cases have a potential for waste and opportunism that would not be
tolerated in the peer systems. 70
If one turns to the medium and small-size cases that constitute the
bulk of the courts’ business, the comparisons seem almost entirely to the
disadvantage of the American system. Our system is more costly, more
unpleasant for litigants and witnesses, and more uncertain than others.
The conclusion that the American system functions poorly is
reinforced by the tendency of parties in contractual relations to opt out of
the court system by agreeing to private arbitration. To be sure, many of
these contracts are adhesion contracts where the stronger party uses its
contracting power to shunt the other into a process more favorable to it.
But even in contracts between parties of comparable resources and
sophistication, there is a tendency to agree to arbitration. Since these are
the cases where the judicial system is least prone to problems of
opportunism, the tendency to opt out seems quite damning.
The most salient explanation for the excessive cost,
unpleasantness, and uncertainty of the judicial system emphasizes the
extreme degree of partisan control, and perhaps also, its unique reliance
on the jury in civil cases.
These points are quite harmful to Legal Liberalism, since the
latter’s commitment to confidentiality and information control gives it a
strong affinity for partisan control and its Populism inclines it to embrace
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the jury. There are, however, two more specific problems that arise
under Legal Liberalism’s operating premises. Each involves inefficiency
in the production and use of information, and hence, in the possibilities
for learning.
1. Disincentives for producing information. First, the operating
premises of Legal Liberalism create very large demands for information
at the same time that they make it expensive to obtain. Procedural
individuation and the commitment to standards when beneficial to the
disadvantaged makes for a very broad range of relevance. The Legal
Liberal ideal is the exploration of all the dimensions of the disputed
situation, at least all those that a disadvantaged litigant thinks relevant.
Respect and dignity are equated in part with the fullness and particularity
of consideration.
But the system makes information hard to get. There are strong
confidentiality norms, and there is a discovery process with limited
disclosure duties controlled by partisans. Moreover, the nature of the
American adversary trial – its combination of compression and adversary
control – has unfortunate effects on the production of information. If
people trust a trial system to produce just results, they have incentives to
preserve evidence of their conduct so long as they are law-abiding.
When someone destroys evidence without an apparent good reason (or
fails to create it when it would do so in the normal course), a
presumption that she is trying to hide something is warranted. 71 On the
other hand, if the trial system cannot be trusted, then law-abiding people
may rationally fear that evidence of their conduct will be misused to
establish liability against them. If this fear is widely recognized, no
presumption can be warranted. In a compressed, party-dominated trial
proceeding, people may fear that evidence of legitimate conduct, when
“taken out of context”, will be used to support liability. If the dangers
are widely recognized, people will cease to take failure to document or
document destruction as a sign of wrong-doing, and this will remove a
major disincentive to these practices.
In fact, growing distrust of the courts seems to have produced a
marked tendency in recent decades to minimize documentation.
Traditionally, the basic norm among law-abiding businesses was to
retain documents as long as any dispute about the relevant event or
71

Wigmore on Evidence, cited in note , at sec. 2524 (adverse presumption from
spoliation of evidence).

40

transaction might arise, say, for the duration of the relevant statute of
limitations. In recent years, however, there has been a tendency toward a
much more restrictive norm – discard everything immediately unless it
will clearly be supportive if a dispute should arise. In addition to
advising such policies, attorneys have often counseled clients to refrain
from taking notes or memorializing meetings and conversations.
Presumably, they believe they can avoid adverse inferences from such
practices because juries and officials will recognize that their fear of
misuse of such information by the judicial system is reasonable, or at
least, genuine. 72 At the same time, some businesses have channeled
discussion of sensitive issues through privileged communications with
lawyers. 73
Such practices, of course, reduce the availability of
information, and increase uncertainty when disputes arise.
The Liberal Legal commitment to rights sometimes interacts with
confidentiality norms in a perverse way. The categorical view of rights
demands that claims be enforced uncompromisingly when made. But
making claims requires information, and rights to information in Legal
Liberalism tend to be weak, in part because of the commitment to
confidentiality. This leads defendants to assert confidentiality norms to
resist disclosure of information in ways that would be socially valuable
but costly to them in terms of liability.
For example, recent studies suggest that medical mistakes occur
in hospitals at a much greater rate than previously thought. Perhaps only
one out of seven results in a medical malpractice case. It would be
72

Such advice was an issue in the prosecution of Arthur Andersen for Enronrelated obstruction of justice. Andersen conceded that it had a general practice of
destroying documents to prevent their use by plaintiffs' lawyers. The prosecution
argued that this suggested consciousness of guilt. Andersen claimed it reflected a fear
that they would be misused "out of context" to create false inferences. It appears that
the verdict against Andersen was not based on its general destruction policy (but rather
on the alteration of a retained document), so the jury may have accepted Andersen's
rationale. Jonathan Weil and Alexei Barrionuevo, "Duncan Says Fear of Lawsuits
Drove Shredding," Wall Street Journal (May 12, 2002), at sec. C, p. 1; Jonathan Weil,
Alexei Barrionuevo, and Casell Bryan-Low, "Auditor's Ruling – Andersen Win Lifts
Enron Case," Wall Street Journal (June 17, 2002), at sec. A, p. 1. In the aftermath of
the Andersen case, there is currently no consensus on prudent documentation policy,
and many corporate lawyers feel unable to advise on it.
73
For an egregious example, see the account of the cigarette industry's efforts to
conceal evidence of the toxicity of their product by putting lawyers in charge of
research activities in Stanton Glantz et al., The Cigarette Papers 24-46 (1996).

41

highly desirable for hospitals to disclose data either publicly or to
industry organizations to assist in self-correction and improvement, as
well as regulation. But to do so would risk an explosion of malpractice
claims. The hospitals insist plausibly that a disclosure regime should
involve either assurance that disclosure could not be used for liability
purposes or broad malpractice reform with a scaling down of awards.
Recent efforts to negotiate such a regime have been scuttled, in
substantial part because the trial lawyers vehemently opposed both
conditions. 74
The preoccupation with confidentiality reinforces the inhibition
of civic organization by impeding non-judicial investigation and
consideration of proble ms. Members of the lay commission appointed
by the Catholic Church to make recommendations about problems of
sexual abuse by priests recently complained that some bishops were
refusing to provide them with needed information. They attributed this
recalcitrance to the influence of lawyers preoccupied with the possibility
that cooperation would make information more accessible to prosecutors
and plaintiffs' lawyers. Following his resignation, the former chair,
Frank Keating, asserted that the non-cooperating bishops "turned to their
lawyers when they should have turned to their hearts." Another member
complained that, while the larger Catholic community believes that
"transparency" on the issues is critical, "[t]he lawyers for a diocese do
not see it that way."75
2. Lack of Coordination of Dispute-resolution and Regulatory
Effects. A good legal system functions both to resolve disputes and to
regulate conduct generally. But the design of the American judicial
system minimizes its regulatory value. Clearly, the prospect of liability
has influence on conduct, but the influence is crude, imprecise, and
occasionally perverse. Some dangerous products have been taken off the
market as a result of lawsuits, and corporate executives are more careful
to disclose business information for fear of liability. On the other hand,
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it is said that some useful products have been removed from the market
for fear of mistaken imposition of liability and employers don’t provide
candid evaluations of former employees to prospective new employers
for fear of having to defend themselves in defamation suits. 76 On
balance, however, the striking failing of the system is the weakness of its
regulatory effects.
Most cases are settled without any liability findings.
A
settlement has no formal precedential value, and its terms are not
necessarily reported at all. Even if they are reported, the basis of the
settlement will be unclear, and no liability will have been established.
Thus, the settled cases have limited value either in clarifying the law or
generating information that might be useful to either private actors or
governments. Yet, cases have to be settled because it is so expensive to
try them.
Moreover, even cases that are adjudicated often yield little or no
useful information for regulatory purposes. The jury as fact-finder is
notoriously a “black box”’; juries usually return only general verdicts,
and they never explain their conclusions.
In the welfare system, the administrative adjudicatory system has
been more or less consciously designed to have no impact on the parallel
administrative system of initial claims determination and case
maintenance. When Congress and later the courts pushed welfare
programs to develop hearings systems with independent, preferably
legally-trained, decisionmakers, opportunities for oral presentations, and
written decisions with reasons based on the evidence, the programs
responded. In most welfare programs, a claimant who files a grievance
is likely to get a respectful, procedurally elaborate hearing, and in fact,
claimants have tended to win these hearings with significant frequency.
The problem is that adjudicatory decisions have no influence on
the cases that claimants do not appeal into the system. In the public
assistance programs, the appeal rates were tiny. There has been ample
reason to believe that significant numbers of these unappealed decisions
would have been reversed if they had been appealed. Failure to appeal
seems to have been often due to ignorance. In effect, these programs
operate two parallel programs – a high-quality respectful process and a
low-quality impersonal one. The two were quite consciously separated
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by bureaucratic walls, separate personnel, and specific instructions that
administrative workers were to disregard adjudicatory decisions. The
situation seems unsatisfactory on both equity and efficiency grounds.
Similarly situated claimants are treated differently depending on whether
they manage to escape the bureaucratic sphere. (At some times, fo r
example, medical conditions routinely deemed by Social Security line
administrators insufficient to establish disability have been commonly
found disabling by the system's administrative law judges. And welfare
hearing officials have applied an estoppel doctrine to excuse eligibility
conditions, such as procurement of documentation within specified
deadlines, where the administrators failed to provide necessary
information or assistance, but no such relief was available to the great
majority of denied claimants who do not make it into the hearing
system.)
And the relatively rich information generated in the
adjudicatory sphere is not used to improve performance in the
administrative one. 77
To some extent, this may suggest a problem of
misimplementation, rather than a basic defect of Legal Liberalism.
Nevertheless, there may be a more fundamental problem. A response to
such problems would need to involve some attenuation of the distinction
between administration and adjudication. This would improve the
quality of administrative decision, but it might require attenuating the
principles of individuation and party control of information in the
adjudicatory sphere. One suspects that some liberal lawyers may have
preferred to sacrifice the administrative sphere in order to maintain the
purity of their vision in the adjudicatory one.
E. Rule and Standard Pathologies
Rules and standards each have disadvantages. The rigidity of
rules means that they sometimes compel decisions that are contrary to
their underlying purposes. The need to restrict the discretion of the
relevant actor requires that he sometimes be forced to make a decision
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that the legislator would not want a more trusted decisionmaker to make.
But the same rigidity of rules can also expand the discretion of the
decisionmaker. He can pursue goals that the legislator has tried to forbid
if he can figure out a way to do so not anticipated in the specific terms of
the rule. Disclosure rules in both the criminal and consumer contexts
exemplify both disadvantages. Under the Miranda decision and the
Truth-in-Lending Act, certain disclosures have to be made, and the
failure to make them, even if harmless, can lead to substantial penalties.
On the other hand, if the disclosures are made, compliance is established
even if they have not been understood.
With respect to standards, a major problem is the tendency for
decisions to become a series of ad hoc determinations with no
discernible consistency or principled basis. The one area where liberals
have emphasized this problem is the death penalty, where they have
condemned decisions under such open-ended norms as "outrageously
and wantonly vile" as inevitably arbitrary. But others plausibly complain
that decisions under a variety of norms that liberals tend to favor – “just
cause” for employment termination or eviction, “unreasonable” for
malpractice or product safety, “informed consent” for medical treatment
– have the same problem.
The problems of rules and standards are not unique to Legal
Liberalism, but they are exacerbated by institutional assumptions that
follow from its commitments to Populism and procedural individuation.
These assumptions are distrust of the street- level public workforce on the
hand and the exaltation of the jury on the other.
Distrust of the lower-tier public workforce inclines Legal
Liberalism toward rules. But because the rule- maker never has enough
time or information to anticipate every contingency (or to monitor
compliance), the worker retains substantial discretion. Moreover, the
rigidity of the rules and the distrust on which they are premised may
alienate the worker and exacerbate her inclination either to slack or to
find ways around the rules. A common response is to try to make the
rules more specific. Here we have the danger of a vicious circle, in
which each effort to tighten the rules merely worsens the actors’
alienation and resistance, and hence the need for more specification.
Such cycles have been played out quite explicitly in the less successful
“public law litigation” efforts in which courts have used command-and-
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control injunctive regulation to try to reform schools, mental health,
institutions, and prisons. 78
The contrasting pathology of standards reaches an extreme with
the “black box” decision maker of the jury. Juries do not explain their
decisions and are not aware of the decisions in analogous situations
made by other juries. Thus, there is no way in which such decisions can
be made consistent.
In both cases, mitigation of the problem requires a culture of
collaborative learning. Rules can work when those subject to them have
some disposition toward voluntary compliance and can be enlisted to
provide information needed to update them. In the private sector, the
modern manufacturing methods pioneered by the Japanese auto industry
exemplify this possibility. 79
Standards can be consistently applied when the decision- makers
have a common understanding of their underlying purposes and an
ability to take account of the decisions made by each other. Judicial
decision- making is an example. In principle, at any given level, judicial
decisions are coordinated in part by the common professional orientation
of judges and their commitment to treat the decisions of their peers as
persuasive authority. (Hierarchical supervision by superior courts plays
a role, but it is too limited to do the job alone.) Something like this
horizontal coordination may actually function with respect to appellate
doctrine and even among the federal trial courts with respect to high
profile legal issues. But most trial court decisions are not reported, and
on most issues, trial judges have relatively limited knowledge of what
peer courts decide. And appellate courts make little effort to review
findings of fact in order to reconcile disparities. Nevertheless, some
efforts to achieve consistency are made with trial court decision- making
and more would be feasible. For example, tort reformers have proposed
that guidelines based on past awards for various categories of cases be
formulated and updated. The guidelines would be presented to the trier,
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and if the trier made an award outside the guidelines, it would have to
justify the departure with specific findings. 80
Such efforts are not precluded by Legal Liberalism, but they are
in some tension with its commitments to Populism and procedural
individuation. Populist distrust of the lower-tier public workforce
engenders skepticism about creating a culture of voluntary initiative
among public workers. Populist infatuation with the jury discourages
taking issues away from it. Some Legal Liberals might even oppose
efforts to constrain jury discretion through guidelines as an undue
limitation on their authority. And regardless of the decisionmaker, such
guidelines would be opposed by some as a violation of the principle of
procedural individuation. 81
III.

Legal Pragmatism

This section elaborates the premises of the body of convergent
works I call Legal Pragmatism. At the risk of over-emphasizing the
contrast, I have formulated and organized the premises so as to
emphasize their differences with Legal Liberalism.
It is debatable whether the Legal Pragmatist perspective is best
seen as a competitor to the Legal Liberalism that addresses the whole
field of lawyering or rather as a complement that purports to be more
appropriate to a range of situations but that concedes a significant range
to the Legal Liberal approach. No doubt the attitudes and strategies of
Legal Pragmatism are more plausible in some situations than others. On
the other hand, the Pragmatists seem reluctant to specify limits to the
applicability of their approach, and they tend to be ambitious. So, in the
current state of the discussion, it seems necessary to defer the question of
scope.
A. Background Premises
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The basic background premises of Legal Pragmatism are the
Citizen Perspective, Associative Democracy, and the Priority of
Solutions.
1. The Citizen Perspective. Pragmatism is oriented toward
citizens. Victimhood connotes weakness, passivity, and self-absorption.
Citizenship connotes interest in and capacity for active participation in
decisionmaking and an at least moderate sensitivity to public values.
Much of the difference between the citizen perspective and the
victim perspective of Legal Liberalism is rhetorical. To some extent, the
objection to the victim perspective is that it lends itself to sentimentality
and patronization. But the difference may go deeper than that. The
category of people likely to benefit from the modes of intervention
favored by Legal Pragmatism probably does not coincide with the
category most likely to benefit from the interventions favored by Legal
Liberalism. In particular, Pragmatist initiatives are likely to by-pass the
most desperate and the most deviant. Pragmatism supposes a measure of
mutual accountability and engagement that may not be attractive to or
possible for everyone.
An intentionally provocative illustration of the difference in
perspective is reported by Paul Grogan and Tony Proscio in a book on
Pragmatist-style social programs that support local economic
development. These programs emphasize an unsentimental approach to
screening applicants for housing or credit assistance.
They
unhesitatingly reject people with criminal records or bad credit histories:
“You mean you turn people away?” one foundation
executive asked incredulously.
“You bet we do,” replied Ginny Brooks, the founder of
the Mid-Bronx Desperadoes, which played so central a role in
saving the South Bronx. “We’re doing enough, turning this
neighborhood around. Don’t ask us to value people who don’t
contribute.”
The executive persisted, “But what happens to them?”
Brooks’s reply: “I don’t care.”82
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No doubt most Pragmatists would dissociate themselves from the
vehemence of this repudiation of the Victim Perspective. A more tactful
response would have been, “There are other types of programs for
them.” The drug courts considered below are an example of a
Pragmatist-style program oriented to a particularly desperate group. But
even programs like these are more selective than many. Addicts charged
with violent crimes are ineligible, for example. More importantly, the
drug courts treat their subjects in a highly regimented manner. In return
for the possibility of ultimately more lenient punishment, as well as
treatment, they must submit at least in the short term to a regime of
infantilizing control and pervasive surveillance. It seems likely that
some would prefer the harsher but less intrusive punishment. 83
Moreover, while the kind of participatory engagement that the
Citizenship perspective connotes is fulfilling for many, it may be a
burden for some. Beyond the requirements of time, the need to articulate
your views to strangers and to do so in the form of publicly acceptable
reasons may be oppressive and alienating. 84
2. Associative Democracy. Associative Democracy is the idea
that citizens should participate in the design and implementation of the
policies that affect them. 85 This participation can take a variety of forms,
but there is a special emphasis on participation through nongovernmental organizations. Associative Democracy counts on the
countervailing power of such organizations to protect against the abuses
of governmental and corporate power emphasized by Populism, rather
than relying primarily on spontaneous unorganized citizen action (as in
traditional Populism) or a virtuous judiciary (as in Legal Liberalism).
Associative Democracy looks in part to the state to foster the
conditions of widespread civic association. The state should provide
83
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support for associations, subject to conditions of openness and
accountability, and should open up access in the policy formulation and
implementation process for them. If the Populist asks why the state
could be expected to support civic associations, rather than crush or coopt them in the interests of its own power, the Pragmatist has two
answers. The first is that state actors are less rapaciously selfish and
more public-spirited than the Populist assumes. The second is that there
are potential gains from such a practice for nearly everyone.
Associations can facilitate a more decentralized and flexible
mode of policy- implementation. They can transmit better information
about citizen preferences. They can better induce voluntary cooperation
in implementation. In facilitating participation, they induce a type of
education and acculturation that potentially creates support for the
policies.
For example, standard setting in work safety and pollution
control requires local knowledge of changing effects and preferences.
Standard enforcement requires continuous monitoring of local practice.
Associations seem well adapted to respond to both needs. Thus, work
safety regulation in many European countries is considered more
effective than in America in part because the European countries give a
major role to unions in both standard-setting and enforcement. 86 And the
Legal Pragmatists have shown that grassroots associational activity has
played a major role in some of the most promising recent developments
in American environmental policy, such as habitat conservation and
toxics monitoring. 87
In appealing to the idea of Associative Democracy, Legal
Pragmatism resonates with a major turn in American public policy in
recent decades. In a variety of programs at all levels of government,
there has been a trend to incorporate citizen participation and to provide
conditional support for interested voluntary associations.
The
opportunities for associational participatio n in regulatory rule- making
have been codified and expanded through measures such as the
Negotiated Rule- making Act. Associations play a more direct role in
formulating industry standards for such matters as safety and product
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quality that acquire legal force through incorporation by legislatures,
courts, or agencies. A growing range of public services, from health care
to housing, are sub-contracted by government to private organizations,
many of them nonprofits with participatory membership structures.
Some of the space emptied by the contraction of traditional welfare
programs has been filled by entrepreneurial community-based
organizations developing housing, employment, or business
opportunities for low- income people. 88
Nevertheless, the Pragmatist literature suggests some caution
about some of these efforts. Associations have the advantages, in
comparison to government, of being closer to their members and more
flexible in organization. They have the disadvantages that they are less
inclusive and less broadly accountable. Thus, the Pragmatist view does
not simply contemplate delegation or "devolution." It is not a vision of
private voluntarism.
Without government intervention, private
associations will not necessarily focus on the issues of most pressing
public importance, will not be accessible or accountable to many
affected constituencies, and will not form at all or will be relatively weak
in disadvantaged areas. Thus, Associative Democracy entails strong
central government institutions that focus efforts on key issues, provide
technical and financial support for associational efforts to deal with
them, and assess and enforce organizational openness and accountability.
If associative democracy is not voluntarism, neither is it
corporatism. Corporatism is a system in which government uses its
support and regulation of private associations to dominate them as
instruments of policy dictated by state officials. 89 The Pragmatist goal is
to achieve support and accountability, while preserving associational
independence.
3. The Priority of Solutions. Pragmatist practice is problemsolving. A legal claim is a suggestion of a problem that calls for a public
solution.
From the Pragmatist point of view, the most important difference
between solutions and rights is that solutions to public problems cannot
88
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be derived analytically. They are best derived deliberatively and
experimentally. The Pragmatist objects to the Liberal idea of rights
enforcement as the elaboration of a pre-existing moral consensus. She
sides with the Legal Realist in insisting that whatever normative
consensus exists in the society is too incomplete and ambiguous to play
the role Legal Liberalism expects.
Whether the Fourth Amendment precludes sweeps of troubled
housing projects, whether the right to property or equal treatment
requires a fault-based tort system, whether the equal protection clause
entails maximum feasible racial balancing – questions like these cannot
be answered plausibly solely through textual interpretation or the
abstract analysis of principle. Our best judgments about them depend on
a range of knowledge that is not derived from the texts in question and
does not take the form of principle. Moreover, these judgments are in
substantial part instrumental and strategic; they depend on assumptions
about the likely consequences of particular decisions. Thus, the
judgments are most plausibly provisional, revisable in the light of later
experience. To the extent that problem-solving connotes a joint
exploration of uncertainty, the term encourages the parties to be candid
about the limitations of their understanding. 90
The rhetoric of problems and solutions suggests common
interests, rather than the notion connoted by the idea of rights of
individual interests competing with group ones. Problem-solving
connotes the possibility of mutually beneficial outcomes. It treats issues
as neither purely distributive nor involving categorical choices between
mutually exclusive positions.
This perspective seems more potent in some situations than
others. It seems more potent, for example, in connection with school
desegregation and tort reform than rent control and abortion. But even
with respect to intensely distributive issues such as rent control, some
options in the range of possible interpretations and implementations
often produce higher benefits or lowers costs to all parties than others.
And even with respect to highly divisive issues like abortion, the
competing positions are often indeterminate with respect to specific
issues of elaboration or implementation – for example, if the mother has
presumptive autonomy, how far into the pregnancy it extends; or if there
90
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is no presumptive autonomy, abortion should nevertheless be allowed to
save the life of the mothe r.
The Pragmatist does not ignore conflicting interests or value
dissensus. She merely assumes, first, that any given set of issues is
likely to involve shared as well as conflicting interest and values, and
second, that it is often a mistake to try to determine in advance of the
dispute resolution process which type of values and interests
predominate. If the process is properly designed, neither the individual
nor the community can know what their interests are before entering it.
Each party’s conception of her own goals may change in the course of
the process because each may learn things in the process about the
possibilities for realizing them.
Thus, Pragmatism declines to single out a particular category of
interests as categorical or trump- like. It doesn’t deny that there are
interests whose value is infinite or that certain types of rationales are
inadmissible. But it suggests that these categories are smaller than Legal
Liberalism tends to suppose and that the attempt to wall them off in
advance of discussion will rarely be useful.
The distinction should not be exaggerated. Every discussion
needs starting points.
Every negotiation presupposes a set of
endowments and assumptions about what will happen in the absence of
agreement. The distinctive tendency of Pragmatism is to insist, as a
descriptive matter, that these starting points are usually indeterminate,
and as a normative one, that people should regard them as provisional.
The Pragmatist conception of problem-solving connotes a less
bounded activity than rights enforcement. A right connotes a claim for
an individual benefit, and rights enforcement connotes finality. Liberal
lawyering is a series of discrete self-contained cases. 91 By contrast, in
Pragmatism problems can ramify broadly, and problem-solving is a
continuous activity. Every resolution is provisional and incorporates
assumptions about its evolution and potential transformation.
Thus, a “problem” can have a range of dimensions. It could be a
demand for compensation for a particular injury; it could be a challenge
to an established processing for compensating such injuries. Pragmatism
91
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blurs the distinction between moves within a framework and challenges
to frameworks. An ostensibly routine complaint is a possible source of
information and initiative that may suggest broader revisions. The
dimensions of the problem may change in the course of discussion.
The courts are less central in this view. In the first place,
assumptions about what institutions are good for have to be tested by
experience, not incanted as dogma from 18th century political theory.
The American judiciary appears to be doing a very poor job of enforcing
a broad range of rights. In the second place, problem-solving usually
requires collaboratio n among different kinds of institutions.
Finally, Legal Pragmatism is inclined to focus on future
collective benefit rather than compensation for past wrongdoing. It
emphasizes the high cost of pursuing corrective justice through the legal
system. Proving and punishing wrongdoing is costly both because it
requires difficult factual inquiries about the connection between past
conduct and current injury and because it polarizes the parties and
encourages procedural conflict. Judicial decisions about right s are
increasingly controversial and often fail to alleviate feelings of injustice,
or may aggravate them. The distinction between people who suffer
injuries from past wrongdoing and those who suffer from similar
conditions but cannot trace them to specific wrongdoing seems arbitrary
in many contexts.
As an example of the Legal Pragmatist emphasis on solutions,
consider a proposal by Archon Fung, Dara O'Rourke, and Charles Sabel
for the human rights problem of international labor standards. 92 They
propose a system of auditing conducted by nongovernmental
organizations in accordance with agreed performance measures. The
results as well as the basis of the audit would be publicly reported.
Firms with similar products could be compared within and across
nations. The more successful firms could be rewarded in various ways –
for example, procurement preferences by public and nongovernmental
organizations, consumer goodwill, good public relations; the less
successful would penalized through analogous mechanisms. For them,
they key point is that standards could be expected to "ratchet" upward, as
the frontrunner firms demonstrated possibilities of better performance.
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They favor this approach over a more conventional one that
would set universal minimum conditions and impose a single set of
powerful sanctions against violators. They object that there is no way to
derive such conditions analytically and that no institution could acquire
enough information to formulate such criteria effectively. They argue
that compliance should not be prescribed in general categorical terms.
Different expectations should be applied to countries in different
circumstances, and standards should be revised quickly as new learning
becomes available. Their approach is only indirectly punitive; it tries to
acknowledge and harness the common interests of firms and workers in
technological advance that makes possible better working conditions and
productivity.
B. Operating Premises
The core operating premises of Legal Pragmatism are stakeholder
negotiation, transparency, and rolling rule regimes.
1. Stakeholder Negotiation. 93 Ideally, problems are solved by
negotiation among the people and groups interested in them. Effective
negotiation involves a decentralized deliberative process supported and
channeled by central public institutions.
a. Deliberation. Deliberation connotes openness and reasongiving. Openness means both a commitment to volunteer relevant
information and willingness to consider opposing positions. Reasongiving means an effort to explain and discuss one’s position in terms of
general or public values. How limiting this condition is will depend on
the circumstances. In many contexts – for example, small informal
groups of people accustomed to speaking in this manner – it should not
exclude first person narratives or discussions of feelings. What the
reason-giving condition most commonly constrains is bargaining based
on threats or claims about the relative power of the parties to inflict
injury on each other. The main objection to such bargaining is that it
impedes the search for mutually beneficial solutions.
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The goal of negotiation is consensus – voluntary agreement by all
stakeholders on the basis of a shared normative understanding. 94 It
would, of course, be naïve to think that such a goal can be routinely or
even often attained, and Pragmatists are usually ready to settle for much
less. The consensus ideal plays an important heuristic role, however.
Striving for consensus, even when unsuccessful, expresses respect for all
stakeholders and puts pressure on the parties to try to understand each
other and search for mutually beneficial solutions.
Of course, negotiation necessarily takes place against a
background in which participants have selfish interests and assumptions
about their distributive entitlements. The Pragmatist, however, relies on
"bootstrapping" – the bracketing of self- interest and distributive claims
in order to focus attention on common interests and values. 95 The
bootstrapping idea is that, once participants start to search for mutually
beneficial solutions, both their conceptions of the problems and the range
of plausible responses is likely to change. As this happens, the
boundaries of self- interest and the distinction between distributive claims
and policy responses are likely to blur. As long as there is any
possibility of significant, mutually beneficial exchange, people cannot be
sure what their interests are, and if they cannot be sure what their
interests are, they cannot be sure whether and to what extent it is in their
interests to assert their rights. Once they start to do so, the more daring
the solutions considered, the less clear it will be how they map onto the
selfish interests of the parties. To the extent that this mapping is
impeded, the parties find themselves forced into a kind of "original
position" in which they have to decide on the basis of the common
interests because they cannot figure out what their individual interests
are.
Consider, for example, the positions of public defenders and
treatment providers deliberating about a drug court regime. 96 The public
defenders may fear that they will lose prominence once treatment
94
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becomes the focus of the process. The treatment providers may
anticipate greater prominence. But the new regime subjects the
treatment providers to new mechanisms of accountability that may
reduce their autonomy and result in reduced rewards for the less
effective ones. The new accountability procedures may create new roles
for the lawyers. It is hard to be selfish when you cannot figure out what
your position will be.
Bootstrapping is the Legal Pragmatist's substitute for, or
complement to, Republican civic virtue. The Republican citizen is
motivated to virtue by a strong sense of solidarity and honor. For the
Pragmatist citizen, such dispositions are supplemented by social
circumstances that present them with the possibility of generally
valuable reforms in which they cannot clearly separate out individual
from collective interests.
Note that the bootstrapping idea implies a different view of legal
process from the one often associated with the common law that
emphasizes the virtues of narrow controversies and case-by-case
decision- making. In Cass Sunstein's recent versio n, by deciding "one
case at a time" within narrow frameworks, we get the benefits of
"incompletely theorized agreement."97 We resolve conflicts more readily
by looking for a confined space where differing views converge and
bracketing broader issues on which it will be harder to reach agreement.
The Pragmatist approach has some kinship with this view. Part
of the idea of "problem solving" is to focus attention on matters that are
of practical importance to the participants and thus divert attention from
merely abstract, moot, or academic disagreement. But defining issues in
practical terms is not the same as defining them narrowly. In Pragmatist
negotiation, problems have a tendency to expand. A discussion about
police responses to street crime may implicate a landlord's tolerance of
drug dealing or the housing code agency's failure to cite the landlord for
code violations, or the park department's failure to light a neighboring
public facility at night. A discussion of failing student performances
might start out with a focus on the classroom practices of particular
teachers but might move to the patters of collaboration and supervision
of the school as a whole.
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Moreover, enlarging the problem has a tendency to increase the
bootstrap effect. As the problem is defined more broadly and the
spectrum of potential resolutions grows, the difficulty of mapping selfinterest, and the consequent openness to possibilities of mutual benefit,
intensifies. No doubt there are dangers of unconstrained expansion of
issues, but the Pragmatist approach emphasizes advantages that the
common law approach ignores.
b. Background institutions. Negotiation takes place in the
shadow of a court or other governmental institution or set of institutions.
These background institutions perform three roles.
First, they they induce affected parties to negotiate and insure
their representation. Especially powerful stakeholders may see no need
to negotiate. Some stakeholders may be excluded without intervention.
A common criticism of negotiated settlements – "devolved
colloboration" – in environmental regulation is that they are often
concluded without adequate representation of key stakeholders. For
example, the "Quincy Library Group" settlement between local logging
and resident interests in the Plumas National Forest in California, which
has been approved in a federal statute and promoted as a model for
environmental regulatory negotiation, was concluded without the
participation of the United States Forest Service or any natio nal
environmental groups. 98 Luke Cole, reporting on three negotiations by
"local assessment committees" over toxic waste facility siting under a
California statute, concludes that two were unsuccessful because poorer
and Latino residents of affected communities were not effectively
represented. 99
Government can try to secure representation by directly
prescribing the composition of institutions as a condition of support or as
a condition of giving legal efficacy to negotiated arrangements. Local
school councils, for example, in "new accountability" educational
reforms typically must have designated numbers of representatives for
98
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parents and teachers, elected by each constituency. Often negotiation
and representation can be induced indirectly by the setting of defaults.
Logging interests that were previously unwilling to negotiate about the
Plumas forest were brought to the table by a federal regulation
drastically reducing the amount of timber they could harvest without
some kind of variance or waiver. 100 The Endangered Species Act has
induced landowners to negotiate over eco-system governance by
effectively making large-scale development of many sites impossible in
the absence of local stakeholder agreement. 101 Representation of
disadvantaged groups can be encouraged by giving them strong rights to
block settlements negotiated in their absence. For example, in many
cities, strong resident rights to challenge major real estate development
encourage developers to negotiate with community groups. 102
It is not important that these default conditions be precise, and
indeed, it is often desirable that they be uncertain. The conditions might
then perform as a kind of “penalty default”103 – a result that no one
wants, and thus gives everyone an incentive to search for alternatives.
Second, the background institutions provide support for the
negotiations. One or more of the parties may require professional
assistance in structuring and conducting the negotiation, for example, a
mediator or facilitator. To the extent that understanding of the problem
requires factual information or technical expertise, researchers and
experts may be helpful.
Archon Fung's study of local participation in school
decentralization and "community policing" reforms in Chicago gives
examples. Fung finds that participation in both processes is as extensive
in poor and minority neighborhoods as in others, and he finds evidence
of efficacy in poor and minority neighborhoods. However, he also
emphasizes the importance of support from the city. In one of the
schools where the parents' council seems to have made a difference, the
council was able to collaborate only after the school's poor performance
triggered the arrival of an "intervention team" of professionals from the
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board of education. The team's report drew the council's attention to
issues they hadn't considered before and helped them organize their
discussions. Similarly, participation in setting policing priorities in a
mixed- income beat was dominated by residents of its relative ly affluent
sector at the expense of poorer neighborhoods until a facilitator provided
by the police department helped organize the meetings.
The
marginalization of the poorer residents was apparently not deliberate; it
arose from an unstructured style of conducting meetings that favored
more self-confident and articulate speakers. When the facilitator adopted
a more systematic approach, new voices were heard, and the group
developed consensus around different set of priorities. 104
Third, the court or coordinate institutions give legal form or
effect to the solution and assist in monitoring and enforcement.
The role of the state then is not impose or devine an outcome, but
to induce and assist the parties to negotiate one and to assist in its
implementation.
2. Rolling Rule Regimes.
Just as every default rule is
regarded as no more than a starting point to be readily discarded as better
options are discovered, so every negotiated consensus is a starting point
for a continuous effort of implementation. Legal Pragmatism resists the
tendency in some versions of the Alternative Dispute Resolution
movement to celebrate agreement as a definitive resolution of conflict. It
makes no strong distinction between negotiation and implementation.
Even if entirely in good faith, the parties will not be able to anticipate the
contingencies that arise in implementation. These contingencies will
generate new information and present both challenges and learning
opportunities. Thus, a pragmatist solution incorporates procedures for
self-revision.
Moreover, while Pragmatism does count as a virtue of
deliberative negotiation its potential to induce good will among
participants, it does not rely more than marginally on altruism. The
implementation regime is thus a regime of accountability designed to
hold participants to their commitments in a precise way.
“Rolling rule regime” expresses this notion of implementation as
a process of both learning and accountability. A rolling rule regime
includes process norms and performance norms. The process norms
104
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specify how operations are conducted – how teachers address a particular
reading difficulty, how manufacturers handle a toxic chemical, how drug
treatment providers respond to client relapse. The performance norms
measure the results of such operations – the levels at which students
read, the amount of use or discharge of a toxic, the degree of self-control
of the addict. Commonly, though not invariably, actors are assessed
primarily on the basis of performance norms. Specified process norms
enable more precise measures of performance and mitigate the danger of
arguments as to whether commitments have been met.
Although actors typically must adopt explicit process norms, they
have discretion over which ones to adopt. In this approach, the process
norms are not a direct basis for sanction or reward; the performance
norms play this role. The process norms have two functions. First, they
encourage systematic and self-conscious planning and self-appraisal
within each institutional actor. Explicit norms make the practices easier
to teach to those who were not part of the discussions that produced
them. Even for the participants, the pressure to be explicit can enhance
mutual understanding. Reliance on tacit understanding risks that the
parties are making different assumptions without realizing it. And the
duty to explicate one’s assumptions can often clarify thought.
Second, they facilitate diagnosis and learning among institutions.
When actors lag in performance, outside evaluators can more readily
determine the problem when the practices are explicitly defined. When
actors perform well, their peers can learn from their success by
consulting their process norms. Thus, the process norms of the most
successful actors become "best practices" available for incorporation by
peer institutions.
For example, in "new accountability" education reform, districts
and schools adopt improvement plans consisting of process norms.
Often, teachers must have explicit lesson plans for each class and
sometimes even explicit improvement plans for each student. The
institutions and the teachers get support from central institutions, and
struggling institutions and teachers will receive firm direction, but they
will retain a range of discretion. They are then periodically assessed by
outcome measures, such as standardized test scores, drop-out rates,
attendance and truancy patterns, and completion of college course
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requirements. Performance scores are publicly reported and trigger
rewards, sanctions, and assistance. 105
In the safety monitoring regime of the nuclear power industry,
plants must have detailed protocols for such matters as maintenance and
responses to operating irregularities. At the same time, they are
periodically assessed on such measures as radiation emission levels, lost
work time from any type of accident, and unplanned shutdowns.
Performance rankings based on these measures (adjusted for plant size)
are distributed throughout the industry and two regulators. 106
Norms in this type of regime have four key characteristics. First,
continuous revision. Both process and performance norms are always
regarded as provisional.
The process of implementation is
simultaneously a process of revision. The process is driven first by the
performance measures, as poor performance prompts review of the
actor's process norms and a search for better practice models among
more successful peers. But the performance norms themselves are
reconsidered. The participants have to be open to the possibility that a
poor score may indicate a defect in the measure, rather than in the
performance. Or that, even if the score is high, the norm is having
counter-productive effects. If the norm forces "teaching to the test" –
focusing on a narrow range of instruction that has little benefit outside
the test – then there should be discussion of changing or revising the test
or supplementing it with alternative measures. Thus, the initial
stakeholder negotiation is not a definitive settlement but the beginning of
an on-going process.
The second characteristic of a rolling rule regime is local
experimentation. The norms require the actors to submit to specified
assessment of their performance, and attach consequences to that
assessment, but they leave the actors broad discretion as to how the
perform their roles. Actors must plan explicitly and collaboratively.
Schools need improvement plans. Drug treatment centers must have
treatment plans. Industries in Massachusetts must have "reduction
plans" for toxic use. But they retain discretion over the contents of the
plans. The best performers are unconstrained. The worst are more
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closely supervised but still retain discretion to tailor the plan to their own
assessments of local conditions.
The third characteristic is scaling. Conventional regulations are
binary. They specify fixed conditions of compliance; an actor is either in
compliance or not. In contrast, a rolling performance measure often
ranks the actor on a graded metric. The California prison medical care
assessment system prescribes for the weighting over various
performance measures to produce a single audit score for each
institution. The Texas Public School Accountability System produces
"report cards" for each school that shows how it ranks on various
measures in comparison to institutions with similar socio-economic
student bodies. The Toxics Release Inventory shows discharges of
specified toxics from each reporting facility in terms of numbers of
pounds. This approach gives more precise information than a binary
compliance norm. It enables identification of the more serious failures
among the lagging performers. It makes it possible to measure
improvement over time in particular actor's performance. It also yields
information about the frontier of possibility from the superior
performers. The regimes often specify minimum performance scores
and attach consequences to failure to meet them. But these minima are
provisional. The expectation is that they will "ratchet up", as the leaders
push back the frontiers. This might be the expectation in a conventional
regime of binary norms as well, but unlike a rolling rule regime, the
enforcement of binary regime does not itself generate the information
needed for revision of the norms. 107
Finally, rolling rule regimes require standardization to facilitate
comparability.
Comparative assessment is only possible when
performance is measured in common terms. Thus, a key rule of central
institutions in a rolling rule regime is to devise and propagate common
metrics. Standardized tests perform this role in education. Some
regimes provide an explicit structure designed to facilitate comparison.
Thus, the Texas education regime constructs for each school a set of
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socio-economically comparable peers aga inst which it is compared on
various dimensions. The Toxics Release Inventory is less structured. In
simply mandates disclosure of discharges in terms of a simple metric –
pounds – along with accompanying information about the nature of the
facility. Users can combine the data in various ways, depending on their
interests. For example, they can determine discharge in relation to
facility size or density of surrounding population. 108
From the point of view of system design, the key task is to devise
measures that are uniform and that track the dimensions in which
comparative measurement is most important. Some earlier school testing
regimes produced scores that were valid only at the district level, rather
than the school level. This is inadequate for a system that gives basic
initiative to schools. A test system that reports only school averages
risks overlooking the shortchanging of poor or minority students in
mixed-race or –income schools. Thus, the new systems typically report
separately for different racial and income groups.
Viewed in jurisprudential terms, the rolling rule regime
represents an important contribution to the analysis of the choice
between rules and standards. We saw that Legal Liberalism tends to opt
for rules for people it does not trust and standards for people it trusts.
Both moves prove disappointing because the rule- maker never has
enough information to frame or enforce the rules properly, and
standards-based decisionmaking tends to become inconsistent and
unaccountable. We can try to mitigate these problems by developing
better institutional infrastructure for the type of normative regime we
choose (for example, better monitoring of rule appliers; more educational
requirements for standards appliers).
But the Pragmatis ts found in contemporary industrial practice, as
pioneered in the Japanese automobile industry, a type of normative
approach that is not captured by the idea of either rule or standard as they
appear in the legal literature. 109 In the Toyota manufacturing system, the
practice of most workers is specified by minutely detailed written norms.
Viewed statically, these norms are conventional rules, but viewing them
statically ignores an important dimension. In practice, situations
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frequently arise in which it is impossible or inappropriate to follow the
rules. An approach to such a situation characteristic of other production
systems is to build into the rules some standards-type exception for
extraordinary situations, or simply to afford tacit discretion to disregard
the rules when following them would be counter-productive. But the
Toyota approach is different. Ad hoc adjustments to unforeseen
circumstances are discouraged. The preferred response is to suspend
operations in order to consider what is wrong with the norms, to revise
them (in accordance with specified procedures that look somewhat like
stakeholder negotiation), and then to re-commence in accordance with
the re-stated norms. 110
The process thus combines, in a manner not contemplated by
rules/standards jurisprudence, the form of the rule with the continuous
adjustment to unanticipated particularity associated with the standard.
Of course, decisions vary in the extent to which they lend themselves to
formalization. And there are different avenues to formalization;
paradigmatic examples can be used instead of indicative commands.
The basic idea is to capture as explicitly as is feasible a constantly
changing practice.
Recent practice with respect of social policy appears to have been
influenced by the kind of industrial practice exemplified by Toyta. In
their study of school reform, Liebman and Sabel observe in some of the
most notable developments, such as the much admired work of District 2
in Manhattan, a trend toward practices that combine formalization with
continuous self-assessment and revision in ways analogous to the Toyota
system and quite foreign to the rule-v.-standards analysis. 111 Traditional
conception of professional practice is based on standards. Practice takes
the form of partly tacit knowledge informally communicated among
peers through observation of exemplary performances and case studies.
But the new approaches in places like District 2 demand systematic
articulation of and assessment of practices through detailed lesson and
student improvement plans and standardized testing. New diagnostic
techniques in reading encourage the detailed coding of student patterns
for diagnostic purposes.
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3. Transparency.
The
third
operating
premise
is
transparency, or open access to information. The premise applies at two
levels. At the level of stakeholder negotiations, the parties must commit
to volunteer material information. This is a pre-requisite for both trust
and effective learning.
At a general level, transparency is essential to the kind of
information pooling that facilitates peer comparisons and the learning
they generate. Thus, we've seen that an important role of background
institutions is both to develop metrics to facilitate the comparison of data
across institutions and to create incentives for these institutions to make
information available.
The Pragmatist view of transparency involves a significant
challenge to the Legal Liberal’s (and the bar’s) values of confidentiality
and lawyer information control. Pragmatism can probably accommodate
a limited confidentiality for intimate matters and perhaps proprietary
business information, but it is committed to oppose broad professional
evidentiary privileges and confidentiality duties, weak discovery and
disclosure systems, and compressed, histrionic, partisan-dominated trial
proceedings. The Citizen Perspective and the Associative Democracy
principle also suggest that, where direct participation in public decisionmaking is possible, it should not be strongly dependent on professional
representatives.
The Pragmatist program thus rejects the bar's argument for
confidentiality as a safe harbor in which people can make disclosures
they would otherwise be afraid to make to lawyers who will channel
them along law-abiding paths. Among many objections to this view, two
are especially salient in Legal Pragmatism. First, at most, the bar's
argument promises compliance with established requirements. 112 But in
a regime of continuous revision, this is insufficient. For the latter
purpose, any information that might disclose problems with or potential
improvements to the rules is relevant. Disclosure may be important even
where there is compliance with the rules in their current formulation.
Second, the lawyers' approach to confidentiality deals with a real
need in a crude and heavy-handed way. The real need is to induce
transparency. The lawyer's approach is a categorical safe harbor for
disclosures, as long as they are made to lawyers. This approach is over112
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inclusive, since it immunizes many disclosures that would be made
anyway or that have little social value (because the lawyer's response
does not lead to compliance). It is also under-inclusive because it is
limited to lawyers.
Consider again the question of disclosure of medical errors. A
regime of continuous improvement would require pooling of information
by hospitals about both errors and efforts to correct them. However, if
such disclosure would expose them to a massive increase in lawsuits and
damage judgments, the hospitals would feel constrained to forego them.
For their part, the trial lawyers invoke the Legal Liberal principle of
confidentiality and lawyer information control to insist that the only
confidential disclosures the hospitals can make are to their la wyers.
Discussions with lawyers, of course, of little use for the purpose of
systemic improvement. 113
The commitment to transparency implies a corresponding
disposition against harsh punitive sanctioning. Pragmatism tends to
favor soft enforcement. Failure triggers supportive intervention first.
When it does trigger coercive sanctions, they are often mild or indirect,
such as the shaming associated with publicly disclosed poor
performance. Sometimes severe but vague sanctions in the nature of
"penalty defaults" to induce negotiations are threatened, but they are
seldom applied. Of the characteristic sanctions in pragmatist regimes,
the most severe involve not punishment, so much as loss of control. The
prescribed ultimately sanction for failure in public institutions is
receivership.
The Texas Public School Accountability System is an especially
well-developed example. It forces broad public disclosure of a large
amount of information pertinent to assessing school performance. But
indicia of poor performance do not lead immediately to harsh
performance. Indeed poor performers initially receive targeted resources
to assist them in improvements. The main sanctions involve loss of
autonomy -- increased supervision by central authorities and ultimately
receivership -- but these are gradually phased in over time. More drastic
sanctions are disfavored precisely because they encourage hiding or
distorting information. 114
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Pragmatism has three reservations about punitive enforcement.
First, failure often arises from incapacity rather than deliberate action. 115
If this is the case, punishment may simply aggravate the situation. Thus,
critics assert that some "high stakes testing" reforms that attach
substantial financial rewards or penalties for teachers and principals to
student performance on standardized tests are misguided. Some of these
tests measure performance in ways that provide relatively little
diagnostic information pertinent to teaching practices. Moreover, most
poor performers require some assistance to identify and rectify the
practices associated with their poor performances. The 1996 welfare
reform legislation has also been criticized for combining arbitrarily strict
outcome standards with counter-productively harsh sanctions. Such
measures seem to invoke the rhetoric of decentralization and
experimentation to cosmeticize recklessly draconian cutbacks. The
regimes most consistent with the Pragmatist view downplay tangible
sanctions and emphasize assistance for change.
Second, severe punishment requires a considerably higher level
of information than softer or less hostile interventions. For any
intervention, the regulator has to calculate both the compliance threshold
that will trigger it and its proper magnitude. But severe punitive
interventions may be less reversible than others and hence require more
planning and information. If severe sanctions cause a school or a plant
to close, it may not be easy to reconstitute it. Moreover, the prospect of
severe sanctions triggers defensive responses on the part of those facing
the sanctions and invokes expensive legal procedures. The evidentiary
threshold the courts require to sustain a punitive regulation or its
application in a particular case is often expensive and sometimes
prohibitive. By contrast, softer interventions can be taken informally.
Finally, the prospect of severe punishment increases the costs of
transparency to some participants and encourages them to distort or resist
disclosure. At worst, it induces fraud. "High stakes" testing in education
appears to have inspired a substantial amount of cheating and
misreporting by teachers. 116 At best, it discourages voluntary disclosure
and fuels claims for confidentiality or proprietary rights with respect to
information of public importance. The recent increase in criminal
115
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prosecutions for lying to federal investigators or Congressional
committees may have had a bigger effect in discouraging people from
volunteering information for fear they will inadvertently incur liability
than in deterring deliberate lying. 117 The tendency we noted above of
witnesses to refuse to speak in Congressional hearings without the
presence of lawyers is sometimes explained in these terms.
Pragmatist programs tend to reserve the most severe sanctions for
violation of disclosure duties. Examples of approaches in this spirit are
"safe harbors" for accurate disclosure, ranging from the South African
Truth Commission to the products liability provisions of the Restatement
3d of Torts that give manufacturers immunity from tort damages if they
both comply with applicable administrative regulations and disclose to
regulators any information they have suggesting that the regulations are
inadequate. 118 Similarly, the enforcement activity most emphasized in
these regimes is the independent auditing of reports of performance
assessments. To an extent, these programs are premised on the idea that,
if the integrity of the information is assured, proper conduct will follow
without punishment.
The Pragmatists emphasize that, without formal state- imposed
sanctions, transparency can trigger informal pressures for compliance.
Clearly, to the extent that noncompliance results from incapacity,
and transparency succeeds in exposing both poor performance and the
methods associated with adequate performance, it can be self-enforcing.
Moreover, private producers sometimes discover that compliance with
regimes designed to achieve social goals have unanticipated synergies
with cost-cutting and product quality strategies that enhance
profitability. 119
It also seems clear that pride in good performance and shame at
bad performance will create incentives of compliance in a regime of
transparent performance ranking. 120
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For private producers, reputation potentially influenced by
performance rankings can affect profitability through customer choices.
A sufficiently large fraction of consumers of some products are
influenced by concerns on such matters as a maker's labor or
environmental practices for manufacturers to be intensely concerned
about their public images with respect to these matters. Such concerns
have prompted many garment manufacturers to sign up for various
monitoring regimes. General Motors and Ford are among the companies
who require all their suppliers to have their environmental practices
certified under ISO 14001 121 -- the International Standard Organization's
environmental management norms -- apparently in part out of concern
for public relations.
No doubt the strength of the customer reputation effect varies
with issue and product, but it can be large. As this is being written, a
major decline in the value of Martha Stewart's media company is being
attributed in substantial part to the effect on her image of the disclosure
that she may have engaged in illegal trading in the stock of another
company. The loss in value is in the range of 100s of millions of dollars;
the potential formal sanction is trivial in comparison.
In the public sphere, transparent assessment regimes can interact
with the electoral process. School reforms often accompany rolling rule
regimes with the establishment or invigoration of elected school site
councils, sometimes with powers to hire and fire principals. The "report
card" sent parents by the Texas regime is designed in part to influence
their votes for local school officials.
Local public officials may consider the performance rankings of
industries in deciding how to exercise there discretion with respect to
such matters as land use permissions, regulatory waivers, or the
allocation of business subsidies. And industries may strive to avoid low
ratings for fear that, even though no punitive sanctions are currently
provided, they may prompt citizens to push for harsh sanctions in the
future, or that courts may decide that they indicate that tort duties of care
have been violated. Such vague background threats of liability may be
far more effective than specific and explicit ones. They are more easily
revisable, less likely to generate expensive legal challenges, and more
likely to prompt productive discussion and negotiation.
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Some combination of these informal pressures apparently
explains the success of the federal Toxics Release Inventory and the
Massachusetts Toxics Use Reduction Act. The federal statute requires
only public disclo sure of toxic discharges. The Massachusetts act
requires a plan for reducing toxic use, but does not mandate any quantity
of reduction. The statutes impose no sanctions for anything except
failure to disclose and, in the Massachusetts case, plan. Yet, both appear
to have induced substantial reductions in toxic polluion. 122
The transparency commitment implies a loss for lawyers of the
comparative advantage that the attorney-client evidentiary privilege
gives them over their competitors and a need for them to develop new
practice models.
Conventional litigation practice is unsuited to
Pragmatist problem solving. So are the forms of transactional practice
dominated by distributive bargaining. But lawyers have recently been
experimenting with different practice styles in connection with
Alternative Dispute Resolution. And in some business contexts, where
client firms structure their relationships in collaborative, problem-solving
terms, the lawyering styles presently involve many of the features of the
Pragmatist approach. 123
IV. Two Case Studies
Pragmatists are inclined to pursue their ideas in particular
practical contexts. So much of the work of the Columbia School takes
the form of case studies. We can best pursue the themes of Legal
Pragmatism by looking at two of them – Michael Dorf and Charles
Sabel’s study of drug courts and Susan Sturm’s study of “second
generation” employment litigation.
In each case, I first summarize the authors’ account of the
operations in question, then consider how they implicate the background
premises of Citizenship, Associational Democracy, and the Priority of
Solutions.
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A. Drug Courts124
The drug court idea emerged in the 1990s in response to the
burden on courts and prisons of the explosion in drug prosecutions, as
well as continuing doubts about the efficacy of traditional punishment
practices for drug-related offenses. There are now more than 400 local
drug courts around the country, encouraged by grants from the federal
government and various foundatio ns.
It has long been recognized that the traditional criminal justice
paradigm fits poorly with many non- violent drug-related crimes. This
paradigm treats each prosecution as a self-contained episode of
wrongdoing, which it seeks to resolve by a discrete punishment. From
the defense perspective of Legal Liberalism, a key role for the defense
lawyer is to impede as much as possible the access of the prosecution
and the court to inculpatory information. The defense lawyer will
pressure the defendant not to volunteer information; will seek to exclude
information that was improperly procured, and will attack incomplete or
ambiguous features of the prosecution’s case. Or more commonly, she
will negotiate away the defendant’s right to these manoeuvres in return
for a reduced punishment.
An addiction-related criminal act is virtually always a continuing
phenomenon. Without effective treatment, the defendant is highly likely
to return to the system. To the extent that effective treatment is possible,
the defendant shares an interest with the community in having it
provided. Punishment is expensive, and the purely retributive concerns
with crimes of this sort are small. Thus, courts have long been willing to
trade punishment for treatment, say, as a condition of probation. What is
new about the drug courts is the way treatment is made the central
institutional focus (rather than, say, relegated to a peripheral probation
department) and the way the court's processes are structured.
In the most common drug court model, if the defendant asks and
the prosecutor consents, charges are filed in the drug court. The
defendant concedes guilt, and treatment becomes the focus of the
proceedings. The defendant, the staff of the court, and one or more
treatment providers under contract with the court negotiate a treatment
plan. The plan puts the defendant in one of several “treatment bands”,
124
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which specify obligations on the part of the defendant and the service
provider and sanctions for non-compliance. The 'band" determines the
frequency of urine testing, program attendance, court appearances and
case management meetrings. The defendant’s duties are likely to include
passing drug tests, court appearances, meetings with treatment
professionals, refraining from illegal cond uct, and other conditions. A
schedule of sanctions is specified for different infractions. The program
treats infractions as normal in the sense of likely, but it also emphasizes
the importance of calibrated sanctions. Compliance is rewarded by
progression through less and less restrictive “bands.” At each stage, the
defendant gets more autonomy.
The defendant appears periodically before the judge,
accompanied by a report on his progress by the primary treatment
provider. In the event of infraction, the judge decides from a menu of
specified sanctions which to impose. The judge can also consider
proposals for modification of the plan.
The treatment plan is individualized in two limited respects. The
plan matches the defendant to the most appropriate of the several
patterned “bands.” There is also some discretion within each band to
tailor the plan to specific needs of the defendant. And the bands
themselves are revised in the light of experience in the program.
At the same time that the court is monitoring the defendant, it is
monitoring its treatment providers, and the court itself is being
monitored by a network of government and non- governmental
organizations. Sub-contracting with multiple treatment providers allows
the court to compare their performances, to encourage learning among
them, and to sanction or terminate poor performers. The same data can
be used to evaluate the court’s own overall performance by the Office of
Justice Programs of the Department of Justice or the Drug Court
Standards Committee of the National Association of Drug Court
Professionals. Data can be collected and compared on such indicators as
program completion rates, recidivism rates, and program cost. These
organizations provide technical assistance and facilitate exchange of
information among programs.
Assessment requires transparency at all levels. The defendant
must submit to extensive surveillance of his personal life. All the data
on his course of treatment is available to the judge and team of
professionals working with him. For their part, sub-contractors and the
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court must make aggregate data on results and diagnostic information
relevant to explaining success or failure.
Assessments comparing the performance of the drug courts to
more traditional approaches are encouraging.
Now consider how these programs implicate the background
principles of Citizenship, Associative Democracy, and Problem-Solving.
First, citizenship. These programs arise from a self- conscious
rejection of the Victim Perspective as applied to drug addiction. The
Victim Perspective tended to argue against punitive or coercive
responses to addiction on the grounds, first, that addiction resulted from
social conditions for which the victim should not be blamed, and second
(somewhat contradictorily) that effective treatment could not be
coercively imposed. Thus, the preferred remedy was decriminalization
coupled with the expansion of voluntary services.
The drug court movement was influenced by recent research
suggesting that, in fact, addicts are as likely to respond to coercive as to
voluntary treatment, perhaps more likely. These studies suggest that
repeated relapse is normal, even in successful cases, and that they are
minimized by a schedule of certain but graded sanctions and rewards.
Although the orientation of these studies is medical rather than
political, the approach they prescribe associates autonomy and
responsibility in the manner of the Citizenship idea. Drug courts subject
the defendant to a potentially infantilizing loss of autonomy. But this
deprivation is premised on the conceded fact that through addiction he
has lost at least some of the capacity for responsible action. The
program involves the defendant in the planning for his own treatment. It
responds to demonstratio ns of increased responsibility with reduced
supervision. Moreover, at least in principle, the program makes itself
accountable to the defendant for providing the services in the negotiated
plan.
Second, associative democracy. The first of the current drug
courts was established in Dade County, Florida, in response to local
protests over the harshness and ineffectuality of conventional responses
to drug cases. When the Department of Justice under Janet Reno, who
had been Dade County District Attorney whe n the Florida experiment
occurred, sought to encourage such programs, it stipulated as a condition
of support that a local team of court personnel, prosecutors, and defense
lawyer be constituted to plan and monitor the project. Many drug courts
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are community courts with narrow, geographically-defined jurisdictions.
Such courts encourage community participation through advisory boards,
community mediation panels, victim-offender impact panels, and town
hall meetings. 125 And many of the service providers who provide
treatment and participate in revision and evaluation of the treatment
providers are local nongovernmental organizations.
The Priority of Solutions operates at two levels. At the level of
the individual, it broadens the view of what is at stake from an isolated
episode of wrong-doing to that of a long-term condition and emphasizes
the possibilities for mutual gain through treatment. At the same time, it
treats the negotiated resolution as a starting point to be improved in the
course of experience. At the systemic level, the Solutions principle
appears in the view of the program, not as a mechanism for resolving
discrete disputes or vindicating an established set of entitlements, but as
a provisional, revisable approach to a social problem.
B. Second Generation Employment Discrimination126
“First Generation” employment discrimination claims tended to
involve allegations of “disparate treatment”— more or less explicit
policies or practices directly disadvantaging women or minority groups.
The characteristic legal response was a lawsuit for damages for the
identifiable victims or an injunction forbidding the discriminatory
practices.
“Second generation” claims tend to involve allegations of
“disparate impact” – practices that are not discriminatory on their face
but seem to produce effects that consistently disadvantage women or
minorities. Salient examples are claims based on subjective hiring and
promotions practices and sexual harassment claims that allege a “hostile
work environment.” In both cases, the defendant employer responds that
it has merely delegated authority to lower tier decision- makers,
invariably with instructions not to discriminate. Most often, it will claim
to have been unaware of any discriminatory acts, and sometimes there
will have been no overt ones. The plaintiff’s case consists mainly of a
showing that women are disproportionately passed over in hiring and
125
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promotion or that they are not comfortable in, or tend to leave, the
allegedly hostile environment. The courts ha ve indicated that plaintiffs
can establish liability with disparate impact evidence. However, the first
generation remedies seem unsatisfactory in this context. The wrongs are
not susceptible to redress by specific negative injunctions, and damage
awards do not directly change the workplace or give the defendant notice
about what it must do to avoid further liability.
Sturm has studied a range of responses to this situation. Some
have been negotiated in the course of litigation or in anticipation of
litigation. Some have been undertaken voluntarily by firms concerned
about employee morale and retention. Regardless of how they originate,
they share characteristics of pragmatist practice.
The structures in question are typically instituted after extens ive
consultation with rank-and-file employees and are designed to facilitate
continued consultation. Management might be able to impose a regime
of its own devising; so might the employees if they prevailed in
litigation. But both sides concede that they lack the understanding to
devise an effective remedy without the other. If the remedy arises from a
lawsuit, then it is negotiated with employees’ counsel, and perhaps with
direct participation by some employees. If there is a union (although this
apparently is only rarely true), the union will be involved. Sometimes
informal employee identity groups participate. The employer can form a
task force with employee representation. Instead or in addition, it can
invite or solicit employee views through sys tematic interviewing,
telephone hot lines, or grievance procedures.
Managers are required to state as explicitly as feasible criteria for
hiring and promotion, and when they deviate from the articulated
criteria, to explicitly justify the deviation. The structures involve
continuous monitoring based on benchmarks, goals, and indicators of
various kinds. Most basically, data on hiring and promotions by race of
gender are kept. Often there are goals specified, and progress toward the
goals is measured and compared with performances of comparable units.
As analysis identifies more specific problems, diagnostic indicators are
established. Where lack of training is an obstacle to female or minority
promotion, the provision of training can be monitored in relation to the
relevant category. And promotional data can be assessed by gender and
race relative to a given amount of training. In an accounting firm that
discovered that one barrier to women advancing was their
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disproportionate failure to get the assignments that led to the most
valuable training and contacts, assignments were monitored by gender.
Where lengthy out-of-town assignments were identified as a problem for
women in balancing work and family, the number and length of such
assignments was monitored. Ad hoc grievances can be examined for
patterns, and the indicators revised as new patterns are discovered. One
company assesses the efficacy of its internal grievance process by
comparing complaints made through this process with outside
complaints, including lawsuits and complaints to public agencies.
Transparency is important to these regimes in various ways.
Data on benchmarks and indicators is available to managers. If there is a
consent decree, it is likely to be available as well to representatives of the
employee class. Even without litigation, it may be shared with employee
representatives. Some companies share such data with each other. An
important part of some regimes is the provision of information on
training and promotion opportunities to employees. At Home Depot, for
example, a computer tracks employee interests and training, notifies both
employees and managers when a relevant job opens up, and send notices
to monitors when ostensibly qualified workers are repeatedly rejected. 127
Note how the second generation approach resonates with the
background premises of Legal Pragmatism.
The new remedial regime implicates a shift in the understanding
of discrimination that parallels the distinction between the Citizen and
Victim perspectives. The old paradigm implied that the plaintiff was a
victim because it treated the defendant as a villain; discrimination was
seen as conscious and malicious wrongdoing. Research, however,
increasingly portrays important forms of discrimination as consequence
of practices that are as likely perpetuated by indifference or ignorance as
by intention. And it also appears that discrimination often arises from
basic cognitive practices of categorization and generalization that do not
involve malice. 128 There are thus opportunities for learning through
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mutual engagement.
To the extent that the Victim Perspective
excessively moralizes the issues and engenders self-righteousness on the
part of the plaintiffs or defensiveness on the part of the defendants, it can
be counter-productive.
The second generation regimes always involve at least gestures
toward employee participation, ranging at the least ambitious, to
procedures for individual grievances, to at the more ambitious,
incorporation of employee groups into negotiation and monitoring.
Without independent unions, initiatives toward Associative Democracy
in the workplace are subject to suspicion about employer domination. In
litigation, the class action decrees can institutionalize countervailing
power.
The Problem-Solving perspective appears from two dimensions.
One dimension is the recognition of an interest shared by firm and
employees in fair treatment, as illustrated by the fact that some of these
regimes have been initiated voluntarily in response to managementperceived recruitment and retention problems. The other dimension is
the broadening of the frame for a series of episodic conflicts with
discrete static solutions to search from improved structures that contain
procedures for learning and self-revision.
IV.

Ambiguities and Limitations

So far, Legal Pragmatism consists of a set of theoretical intuitions
and a series of case studies. The intuitions are explicitly tentative and
incomplete, and the case studies are necessarily ambiguous. Most of
them involve nascent experiments. Even if we treat them as success
stories, the question remains whether the success is attributable to a
limited set of problems or social circumstances, rather than the capacity
Pragmatist method to respond to a broad range of problems.
It is to the credit of this kind of theory that it makes its limitations
so explicit by eschewing axiomatic formalism and interpreting its
findings modestly and tentatively. Yet both the plausibility of Legal
Pragmatism as a general orientation and the capacity to apply it to
particular problems is constrained by a series of critical ambiguities.
In particular, there are four especially important concerns about
the practical approach suggested by the operating premises of
stakeholder negotiation, rolling rule regimes, and transparency. If I
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focus on the operating premises, it is not because I regard the
background premises as less debatable. It is because the operating
premises seem the most original but least developed aspect of the
Pragmatist contribution.
A. Vagueness About Domain
Legal Pragmatism is sometimes ambiguous as to whether its
approach is a complement to Legal Liberalism that is better adapted to
some contexts, or rather a global competitor that could occupy the entire
field. Deliberative negotiation would seem to have pre-conditions. The
parties have to have some uncertainty about how the matter should be or
will be resolved, and they have to believe that mutual gain is possible.
The parties ha ve to be capable of deliberation, which means treating each
other with respect and remaining open to learning. Clearly, these
conditions are not invariably satisfied.
The issue of the productivity of deliberation can arise from two
perspectives. First, the weaker party contemplating whether to enter a
negotiation has to consider whether she will be worse off than if she
takes a more aggressive course. 129 She has to worry that she will signal
weakness to the opposing party. Or that the negotiations will weaken her
coalition by slowing things down, or raising internally divisive issues, or
depriving them of the possibility of a clear symbolic victory. She has to
worry that, because she lacks skills and information, she may be
manoeuvred into a worse deal than she could get by fighting. For
example, some unions are reluctant to participate in labor standards
monitoring regimes of the sort the Pragmatists recommend for fear that
their involvement will be construed as an endorsement of high-scoring
firms. Apparently, they are reluctant to give endorsements because they
fear they will make mistakes and because they think they can mobilize
workers best with a clear message of militance.
Second, the legislator or policy- maker contemplating whether to
encourage and support negotiation has to consider whether negotiation
will lead to a worse outcome from a public point-of-view than alternative
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interventions. 130 One alternative course to direct support for negotiation
would be a revision or re-assignment of rights. We could enhance the
rights of the weaker party and then leave it to her to decide whether to
negotiate in her strengthened position. For example, if the problem is
employment discrimination, we could ease the plaintiff's burden of proof
or make punitive damages automatic. The plaintiff's default position –
the net value of her claim discounted for time and the risk of losing –
would increase, and so would her bargaining power in any negotiation
she decided to enter into. If the problem is non-violent addiction-related
crime, we could reduce the penalties for it.
Another alternative intervention would to directly strengthen the
weaker party, say, by transferring resources or organizing assistance.
We could deal with discrimination by making it easier to organize unions
or respond to the drug addiction problem by increasing the funding for
public defenders.
The Pragmatist tends to respond to both the strategic actor and
the policy- maker by emphasizing the indeterminacy of the situation.
There are risks to the strategic actor of negotiating, but there are also
potential benefits, and more often then not, it is impossible to reliably
assess their relative magnitude in advance of entering into the
negotiation. But of course, indeterminacy cuts both ways. It is as much
a reason to hold back as to leap forward. The Pragmatist's presumption
in favor of going forward seems to be based on a predisposition to
optimism and a belief that the strongest cultural influences on many
strategic actors (Legal Liberalism, for example) are most likely to bias
them against negotiation.
The response to the policy- maker seems to be that all three types
of interventions – direct support for negotiation, re-assignment of rights,
and strengthening weaker parties -- should be considered and that the the
latter two will often complement, and rarely pre-empt, pragmatist
negotiation. A basic pre-condition of stakeholder negotiation is that
none of the stakeholders has the power to proceed unilaterally. Where
that condition does not obtain, the policy- maker can open up deliberative
possibilities by re-adjusting the balance of power through changes in
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default endowments or direct assistance. Once that condition has been
obtained, the indeterminacy point arises. It is unlikely that the policymaker can insure anything like optimal outcome solely by adjusting the
balance of power. The policy- maker has no way of knowing what the
optimal outcome is without stakeholder negotiations. Thus, the policymaker needs to induce negotiation, and for that purpose direct
encouragement and support for negotiation will sometimes be more
effective than power re-adjustment.
This may seem plausible as far as it goes, but the vagueness
about the range within which deliberation is productive seems a
weakness.
B. Incomplete Sublimation of Distributive Issues
The Pragmatist approach requires the transcending of distributive
bargaining. In distributive bargaining, people argue about their current
entitlements and the position they would be in absent agreement. They
argue about what these entitlements and positions are and about the
proper division of the savings in the costs of disputing that settlement
would accomplish.
This kind of bargaining is inimical to Legal Pragmatism. It is
quite risky. It can fail because people mis-estimate their default
positions, or because they lock themselves into aggressive strategic
postures, or because they want a symbolic or emotional vindication that
settlement would not provide. Moreover distributive bargaining diverts
energy and resources from the search for mutually beneficial
solutions. 131
Yet, distributive bargaining would seem hard to avoid. People
will not enter into negotiations unless they think they can do better by
doing so, and they won't agree to solutions unless they think the
solutions are better than their default positions. The process depends on
each participant having some sense of her default position. Moreover, it
will often be in the interests of parties to persuade others that their
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default positions are worse than they think or purport to think they are.
Thus, distributive bargaining seems inevitable, as well as inimical.
We saw that the Pragmatists look to "bootstrapping" to mitigate
this problem. If the parties can be induced to bracket distributive
concerns and focus on common interests, then the creative exploration of
alternative responses may loosen their understanding of how their selfish
interests fit in the larger structure. But this implies a further pre-requisite
and limitation: The situation must be one in which most stakeholders see
the possibility of major collective improvements in which they might
share but in which there is major uncertainty about the relation between
their selfish interests and the general interest. This rules out situations in
which some major stakeholders are doing as well as they can imagine
doing. It also rules out situations where all of the options are fairly
familiar and well- understood.
The case studies suggest that situations with the right
combination of possibility for gain and uncertainty arise with some
frequency. But they do not establish that most social disputes or
problems involve such situations. And where the pre-requisite is not
satisfied spontaneously, the very uncertainty that bootstrapping seeks to
exploit will limit the ability of policy- makers to generate it.
C. The Problem of Interest Representation
Legal Pragmatism has little to say about who has standing to
participate in stakeholder negotiations and how the views of different
participants are to be weighed in decisionmaking. We could limit
standing to people with interests of a minimum size, and we could weigh
the views of participants in proportion to some measure of the interests
of the people they represent. It is, however, extremely difficult to
measure or weigh interests. Nor can the participants' claims as to whom
they speak for be readily assessed. 132
The Pragmatists believe that these difficulties are less troubling
for their approach than for others. The function of negotiation for them
is not to identify and aggregate interests; it is a search for the common
good. The hope is that such a process will produce decisions that nonparticipants will recognize as good. Failing that, legitimacy depends on
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showing nonparticipants, not that they were represented in any agency
sense, but that their views were considered. 133 For these purposes,
weighing interests is neither necessary nor desirable. What is important
is that the full range of views in the socie ty are expressed and
considered. They should be considered, moreover, not on the basis of
the magnitude of the interests the speaker represents, but in terms of the
persuasiveness in terms of shared interests and values. Thus, we can
dispense with complex standing rules in favor of a presumption of
inclusion, and with weighing rules, in favor of a consensus standard for
decision.
These responses are not entirely satisfactory. There needs to be
some limits on inclusion, and consensus will often be impossible. More
importantly, even where consensus is reached after good faith, highquality deliberation, the negotiations and the decision will be affected by
the pre-existing organization of interests. The best organized and
financed groups and interests will tend to be better represented and have
more chance of influencing the deliberation. (Even if we assume they
are thoroughly principled deliberators, they will be more articulate, more
skilled at negotiation procedure, and better able to document their
claims.)
Pragmatists recognize this problem and prescribe that the state or
NGO sector assist under-organized groups and interests. 134 The problem
is that that task would seem to require something like the weighing of
interests that Legal Pragmatism sought to avoid through deliberation.
How can we decide which under-organized groups and interests should
be given support and how much support they should be given without
some weighing of interests?
D. The Reversion Danger
In the Legal Liberal perspective, people are most often arguing
about what they are entitled to because of what happened in the past.
They back up their assertions by interpretations of legal authority and
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evidence of past conduct. The Legal Pragmatist perspective tries to bypass suc h issues by focusing on solutions. Deliberating about solutions
involves predictions about the future, and the principal way parties back
up these assertions is by agreeing to submit to accountability regimes
involving performance measurement and rewards and sanctions.
We've seen that a critical role in the initial deliberation is played
by uncertainty about how selfish interests will fit in a reformed regime.
But at best this uncertainty operates only ex ante. Once the regime is up
and running, people's roles will become more defined and their sense of
self- interest will be clearer. Of course, Pragmatist regimes aspire to
revise themselves continuously, so there is always an element of
uncertainty and open possibility about the future. But after the initial
round, the accountability mechanisms have to be applied, and this entails
some assessment of past performance. Parties will have definite selfish
interests with respect to this assessment.
Both the initial round and every subsequent round anticipate the
problem of differing interests in assessment by specifying performance
measures as much as possible. But these standards have to be
provisional. Thus, every occasion for the assessment of performance is
also an occasion for the assessment of the standards.
Every
measurement of performance is at once potentially an indication of good
or bad performance or an indication that something is wrong with the
measures. Thus, there is the risk that distributive conflict will break out
every time the accountability mechanisms are applied.
Cooperation under the new regime may develop a solidarity that
inhibits opportunism. But to the extent that Legal Pragmatism depends
on solidarity, that represents a further limiting condition that will not be
present in many circumstances.
V. Conclusion [to come]
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